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The housing crisis has left in its wake an ongoing legal crisis. After housing
markets began to collapse across the country in 2007, foreclosures and
housing-related bankruptcies surged significantly and have barely begun to
abate more than six years later. As the legal system has confronted this
aftermath, courts have increasinglyaccepted claims by borrowers that lenders
and other entities involved in securitizing mortgages failed to follow
requirements related to perfecting and transferring their security interests.
These cases - which focus variously on issues such as standing, realparty in
interest, chains of assignment, the negotiabilityof mortgage notes, and the like
- signal renewedformality in nearly every aspect of the resolution ofmortgage
distress.
This new formalism in the aftermath of the housing crisis represents
something of an ironic turn in the jurisprudence.From the earliest history of
the mortgage, lenders have had a tendency to invoke the clear, sharp edges of
law, while borrowers in distress have often resorted to equity forforbearance.
The post-crisis caselaw thus upends the historical valence of lender-side
formalism and borrower-sideflexibility.
Building on this insight, this Article makes a normative and a theoretical
claim. Normatively, while scholars have largely embraced the new formalism
for the accountability it augurs, this consensus ignores the trend's potential
negative consequences. Lenders have greater resources than consumers to
manage the technical aspects of mortgage distress litigation over the long run,
and focusing on formal requirements may distractfrom responding to deeper
substantive andstructuralquestions that still remain largely unaddressedmore
than a half decade into the crisis. Equally telling, from a theoretical
perspective, the new formalism sheds light on the perennial tension between
law's supposed certainty and equity's flexibility. The emergingjurisprudence
underscoresthe contingency ofproperty and thus reinforces - again, ironically
- pluralist conceptions of property even in the crucible of hard-edged
formalism.
INTRODUCTION

The aftermath of last decade's housing boom and bust has generated an
ongoing legal crisis. In the ten years prior to 2007, mortgage delinquencies
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averaged 4.7% annually, and the foreclosure start rate in that same period was
a relatively low 0.42%.1 After the housing crash, mortgage delinquencies
increased to a January 2010 high of 10.57%,2 and although they have dropped
since then, more than a quarter of all homeowners currently owe more on their
mortgages than their homes are worth.3 Not surprisingly, nearly four million
homes have gone through foreclosure since 2008,4 and the percentage of
outstanding loans in foreclosure continued through the end of 2012 to be at a
historically high average rate of just over 3.5%.5 Thus, even as the economy
has begun to recover, foreclosures and housing-related bankruptcies continue
to roil the legal system.
As borrower advocates have responded to this surge in mortgage distress,
they have found success raising a series of largely procedural defenses to
foreclosure and mortgage-related claims asserted in bankruptcy. These
challenges have focused on issues such as lender or servicer standing, real
party in interest, faults in the chain of mortgage and note assignment, and
notice requirements, the bulk of which reflect problems in the process of

1 See U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEv., U.S. HOuSING MARKET CONDITIONS 78 tbl.19
3
(2009), available at http://www.huduser.org/portal/periodicals/ushmc/fall09/USHMC-Q 09
.pdf. For data on foreclosure-related bankruptcies (compiling data from the Mortgage
Bankers Association's National Delinquency Surveys), see infra note 41.
2 LENDER PROCESSING SERVS., LPS MORTGAGE MONITOR: DECEMBER 2012 MORTGAGE
PERFORMANCE OBSERVATIONS 6 (2012), available at http://www.lpsvcs.com/LPSCorporateI
20
1211 MortgageMonitor
nformation/CommunicationCenter/DataReports/MortgageMonitor/
delinquency rate as of
The
data).
loan-level
(tracking
/MortgageMonitorNovember20l2.pdf
the end of December 2012 was 7.17%, a drop from the December 2011 rate of 9.11%. Kerri
Ann Panchuck, Mortgage Delinquencies Tick up in December, HOUSINGWIRE (Jan. 13,
2013, 8:19 AM), http://www.housingwire.com/news/2013/01/23/mortgage-delinquencies-tic
k-december.
Dino Grandoni, 29% of U.S. Homes Underwater (Figuratively),ATLANTIC WIRE (Nov.
8, 2011), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/national/2011/11/29-us-homes-are-underwater-fig
uratively/44699/.
4 Press Release, CoreLogic, CoreLogic Reports 55,000 Completed Foreclosures in
November (Jan. 3, 2013), availableat http://www.corelogic.com/about-us/news/corelogic-r
eports-55,000-completed-foreclosures-in-november.aspx.
s LENDER PROCESSING SERVS., supra note 2, at 6. At the peak (or, perhaps, nadir) of the

foreclosure crisis, in the fourth quarter of 2010, the average foreclosure rate on outstanding
mortgages nationwide was 4.6%. Press Release, Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, Delinquencies and
Foreclosures Decline in Latest MBA Mortgage Delinquency Survey (Feb. 16, 2012),
982 7
.htm.
available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/7
These average figures obscure the depth of the crisis in particular states and communities,
given that the foreclosure crisis has hit different housing markets in very different ways. See
1.8 Million U.S. Propertieswith ForeclosureFilings in 2012, REALTYTRAC (Jan. 14, 2012),
http://www.realtytrac.com/content/foreclosure-market-report/2012-year-end-foreclosure-ma
rket-report-7547 (reporting the concentration of foreclosures in states such as Arizona,
Nevada, California, and Florida).
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mortgage securitization. 6 The requirements at issue in these cases are all
longstanding, but were rarely invoked before the housing crisis. 7 Indeed, until
the collapse of recent years, the mortgage system largely accommodated the
demands for informality that characterized the growth of the secondary market
during the housing boom, masking what former New York Chief Judge Kaye
has described as "the incongruity between the needs of the modem electronic
secondary mortgage market and our venerable real property laws." 8
This renewed formalization in the mortgage distress system is a curious turn
in the jurisprudence on several levels. From the earliest history of mortgage
law, lenders have had a tendency to invoke the hard edges of law's formal
clarity, while borrowers have often resorted to equity to obtain a measure of
substantive fairness in the face of such strictures. This tension began with the
emergence of the mortgage as a form of conveyance, with lenders able to
retain title if borrowers did not repay their debt in full on the precise day and
place due. 9 This requirement, strictly construed by courts of law, created
obvious incentives for lender opportunism, and borrowers began to invoke
equity's flexibility to respond to the resulting unfairness.' 0 The Chancellor
accordingly allowed borrowers to redeem their property within a reasonable
period of time if they could repay their debt, and eventually lenders sought to
foreclose what became known as the equity of redemption."' This basic tension
has continued in various guises throughout the development of the mortgage,
playing out over time in ways that have left a residue on a number of
contemporary doctrines.12
The recent turn in the caselaw thus represents an intriguing inversion of the
historical valence of law and equity in the realm of mortgages, and property
more broadly.13 As borrowers have successfully argued for strict application of
a variety of formal requirements, lender-side interests have responded by
making essentially equitable arguments for flexibility, invoking what they
posit is substantial, even if not technical, compliance.14
6 See infra Part I.B.
See JOHN RAO ET AL., NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FORECLOSURES: DEFENSES,
WORKOUTS, AND MORTGAGE SERVICING § 4.4.1, at 113 (3d ed. 2010) ("Before the rise of
securitization, advocates seldom raised questions about the foreclosing party's authority to

proceed.").
8 MERSCORP, Inc. v. Romaine, 861 N.E.2d 81, 86 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, C.J., dissenting).
9 See 1 GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 1.2, at 7-8
(5th ed. 2007).
10 Id. § 1.3, at 8-9.
" Id.; see also infra note 136 and accompanying text.
12 See infra Part II.A.

" The concept of formalism is being deployed here less in the classical sense of a
complete, hermetic, and rationally determined legal system, and more in the sense of a
relatively mechanistic rule orientation. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALISTREALIST DIVIDE 159-67 (2010).

14 See infra Part I.B.
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. This ironic reversal holds lessons for evaluating the emerging post-crisis
jurisprudence and also sheds light on core debates in property theory.
Normatively, the courts' new-found aggressive enforcement of longstanding
formal requirements has been lauded by scholars focused on the consumer5
protection aspects of this development.' Peter Pitegoff and Laura
Underkuffler have argued, for example, that the emerging caselaw embodies
"several important principles," including protection for the home as shelter,
preserving the burden of proof on the party who would involuntarily transfer
6
that home, and the necessity of judicial oversight.1 David Dana has offered a
similar defense of what he calls "mortgage formalities," arguing that beyond
keeping people in their homes, these requirements are important to reflect the
expressive value of home and equality before the law, as well as to prevent
future foreclosure crises.' 7 These perspectives are in line with the views of
many advocates and regulators that the informality of the secondary market has
8
caused real harm to consumers.'
On one level, this view is undoubtedly correct, and for any homeowner
facing foreclosure or a claim in bankruptcy, the guarantee of procedural
regularity would be hard to gainsay. This understanding, however, is both
incomplete and overly optimistic. The role that equity has historically played
for borrowers suggests reasons for caution in embracing an emphasis on
technical precision over substantive review, and the emerging trend may have
unintended consequences in the long run.
It likely will not take long for servicers, lenders, securitization
intermediaries, and investors to adapt to the new landscape of mortgage
distress. If the current trend holds, borrowers may find themselves, once again,
on the historical short end of the formalism/flexibility balance. Moreover, there
is a distinctive mismatch between the new formalism and equity's traditional
15Conversely, some commentators have been critical of the new formalism as providing
a windfall where there is little doubt that a borrower is in default. See Les Christie,
ForeclosureFree Ride: 3 Years, No Payments, CNNMONEY (Jan. 1, 2012, 4:40 PM), www.
money.cnn.com/2011/12/28/real estate/foreclosure/index.htm (arguing that homeowners
asserting formal defenses to foreclosure "are staying in their homes based on a
technicality").
16See Peter Pitegoff & Laura Underkuffler, An Evolving ForeclosureLandscape: The
Ibanez Case and Beyond, 5 ADVANCE 131, 138-42 (2011).
17 David A. Dana, Why Mortgage "Formalities" Matter, 24 Lov. CONSUMER L. REV.
505, 507-08 (2012).
18See, e.g., Complaint at 5, People v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 2768-2012
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 3, 2012), 2012 WL 361985 (alleging that the Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) created a "bizarre and complex end-around of the
traditional public recording system"). For a discussion of the emerging trend as bringing
much-needed accountability to a mortgage system plagued by what some advocates have
described as "fraudclosure," see Peter Linzer & Donna L. Huffman, Unjust Impoverishment:
Using Restitution Reasoning in Today's Mortgage Crisis, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949, 967
(2011).
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role in assuring substantive protection for the more vulnerable party in
residential mortgage transactions - a mismatch that highlights the need for a
more context-sensitive approach.19 While it is true that claims based on
technical requirements may leverage a more substantive regulatory agenda, it
is also possible that focus on procedural regularity will distract from structural
reform.20
Indeed, the current crisis has yet to produce significant structural changes in
the realm of home lending akin to what earlier economic crises generated. The
New Deal, for example, witnessed widespread debt moratoria and provisions
for mortgage restructuring, and although some recent efforts have been made
in this direction, 21 they are relatively modest. 2 2 Regulators are starting to
develop these structural reforms, and the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau's implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act may make a difference for
new loan originations. 23 Most contemporary regulatory approaches in this
arena, however, are prospective, and it is not yet clear how deep the change
will be even from those approaches. Policymakers and scholars are thus
grappling with how to reform the home-finance system in ways that retain the
benefits of securitization for liquidity and access to global capital markets, but
that attend to the reality that the underlying assets for residential mortgagebacked securities are people's homes. 24

" This is not to make an overly reductionist argument that law's rule orientation
safeguards only lenders and equity's flexible standards protect only borrowers. Equity can
aid lenders - as with the historical development of the foreclosure of the equity of
redemption - and there are borrower-protective, classically crystalline procedural rules. See
infra Part II.B.
20 See infra Part III.B.
21 See Geoff Walsh, The Finger in the Dike: State and Local Laws Combat the
Foreclosure Tide, 44 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 139, 139-44 (2011) (describing Depression-era
foreclosure-relief legislation, and providing an overview of current statutory and regulatory
responses to the foreclosure crisis).
22 Most notably, home mortgage debt, which was carved out of the reach of bankruptcy
in 1978, retains immunity from mandatory modification and other relief, despite significant
calls for reform. See generally Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis:
Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 2009 Wis. L. REv. 565; Juliet M. Moringiello,
Mortgage Modification, EquitableSubordination,and the Honest but Unfortunate Creditor,
79 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1599 (2011).
23 See Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, Reforming Regulation in the Markets for
Home Loans, 38 FORDHAMURB. L.J. 681, 682-83 (2011).
24 See, e.g., Gerald Korngold, Legal and Policy Choices in the Aftermath of the Subprime
and Mortgage Financing Crisis, 60 S.C. L. REv. 727, 732 (2009); Tanya Marsh,
Foreclosuresand the Failure of the American Land Title Recording System, 111 COLUM. L.
REv. SIDEBAR 19, 24-26 (2011), http://www.columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/20
11/03/19_Marsh.pdf; Dale A. Whitman, A Proposal for a National Mortgage Registry:
MERS Done Right (Oct. 5, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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This Article seeks to add to the discourse an understanding of relevant
remedial dynamics in light of the longstanding divide in mortgage history
between law and equity. The phenomenon of borrowers pressing for a more
rule-like environment for the resolution of mortgage distress, and courts
rejecting lender-side arguments for flexibility, underscores the need for
caution. In designing a home-finance system moving forward, it would be
problematic to shift too far toward procedural reform over structural efforts to
respond to the legacy of the housing crisis. 25
The other primary ambition of this Article is to link the shift underway in
mortgage law to longstanding debates in property theory, most notably
property law's balance between formalism and flexibility. 26 Property theory is
experiencing a resurgence as a locus for conceptualism, which valorizes
property's seemingly enduring forms, with scholars emphasizing the simplicity
and clarity of a conceptual core to property. 27 Property, however, has always
had its equitable adjustments to counterbalance the perceived benefits of
formalism's purported certainty, and this perspective informs a competing
pluralist understanding that privileges contingency and the social function of
property. 28 The mortgage has long been a prime locus for this tension between
fundamental conceptions of property - what Carol Rose famously described as
cycles of "crystals" and "mud" in property law.29
At first blush, the new formalism would seem to support the primacy of
conceptualism in this dialectic, with its emphasis on rule-like approaches to
resolving conflicts in property. The emerging mortgage jurisprudence,

25

This formalism is problematic for lenders and mortgage investors as well, although the

focus of this Article is primarily on the trend's implications for mortgagors. It now takes
nationally an average of 414 days to foreclose, with state averages reaching a high of 1089
days in New York, 987 days in New Jersey, and 853 days in Florida. 1.8 Million U.S.
Properties with Foreclosure Filings in 2012, supra note 5. The so-called "overhang" in
housing stock this has left in a number of markets has been a serious impediment to housing
recovery. See Alan Mallach, REO Properties,Housing Markets, and the Shadow Inventory,
in REO & VACANT PROPERTIES: STRATEGIES FOR NEIGHBORHOOD STABILIZATION 13, 16, 20
(Fed. Reserve Banks of Bos. & Cleveland & the Fed. Reserve Bd. eds., 2010), available at
http://www.bos.frb.org/commdev/REO-and-vacant-properties/1 3-Mallach.pdf.
26 For a discussion of the landscape of property theory in the housing crisis, see generally
Nestor M. Davidson & Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Property in Crisis, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 1607
(2010).
27 See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARv. L. REv. 1691,
1700-16 (2012) (elaborating on a modular theory of property).
28 See generally Joseph William Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law (Harvard
Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 12-39, 2012).
29 Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577, 583-85
(1988). As Rose described it, the pattern (evident particularly in mortgage law) has been one
of seemingly determinate entitlements yielding to judicial meddling in the face of otherwise
harsh results, followed by attempts at contractual clarity, only to be further muddied by
judicial intervention. Id. at 585.
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however, has sprung up in response to the felt necessities of the crisis in a
highly contextual manner. Courts have responded to consumer claims by
reshaping old doctrines to rebalance a mortgage distress system that had grown
overly informal in the tide of securitization. In a final irony, then, the very
contingency that is reflected in the new formalism actually underscores the
pluralism inherent in equity's adjustments.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides context for understanding
the legal consequences of the housing crisis, noting the particular challenges
posed by the intersection of primary mortgage market fundamentals and norms
that until recently predominated in the secondary market. It then outlines
several aspects of formalization as individual borrowers have defended against
foreclosures and related proceedings. Part II situates this emerging
jurisprudence in the context of the longstanding tension in mortgage history
between law and equity, and explores the irony of lender-side arguments for
retaining liquidity-related informality. Part III, finally, reflects on what the new
formalism means for ongoing debates about both home-finance reform and
property theory. It evaluates explanations for this new trend and notes some
grounds for caution about the mark it might leave as the housing crisis
reshapes mortgage law and, perhaps, property law more generally.
I.

IN THE AFTERMATH: THE HOUSING CRISIS INTHE COURTS

The aftermath of the housing crisis that began to emerge in 2007 has
brought to the surface deep tensions between two very different systems that
constitute our housing-finance system. Securitization facilitates liquidity and
reduces locational distortions in real estate markets by linking mortgage
lending to broader capital markets. This superstructure exists on top of a
traditional property system that recognizes the distinctive nature of the home as
collateral and prioritizes the consumer-protection aspects of the home
mortgage. As the crisis has evinced, this dual system has had repercussions not
just in terms of the macro economy, but also for the daily functioning of the
mortgage system. This Part accordingly begins with some context for
understanding this dynamic, describing the basic landscape of these two
systems and the crisis that has brought them into conflict. It then describes how
securitization is changing mortgage-distress practices in the legal fallout from
the housing crisis.
A.

The System Breaks Down

1. A Snapshot of the Housing Boom and Bust
The basic arc of the housing bubble, its collapse, and the aftermath over the
past decade and a half is well rehearsed at this point, and only a few significant
highlights bear repeating for present purposes. 30 For more than a half century,
30 For an excellent survey of the causes of the crisis, see Adam J. Levitin & Susan M.

Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO. L.J. 1177, 1181 (2012). See generally
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starting with a series of federal reforms in the New Deal, the home-finance
system followed a relatively simple model. Savings and loan associations and
commercial banks used their own insured depositor funds to originate new
home loans, which were predominately long term, fixed rate, and selfamortizing, and then held and serviced those loans.3 1 Home-price appreciation
from the end of World War II through the late 1990s was relatively stable, with
fairly minor fluctuations and generally modest appreciation. 32
For a variety of reasons that are still under debate,33 however, from roughly
1997 to a peak in 2006, home prices in the United States increased by roughly
eighty-five percent, adjusted for inflation. 34 Some of the supply- and demandside factors that scholars have pointed to as influencing this rapid increase
include monetary policy that held interest rates low after the dot-com crash at
the end of the 1990s; the loosening of credit and origination standards,
originally in the subprime market, but eventually in the prime market as well;
federal policies that sought to bolster the homeownership rate; market
fundamentals in particular regions; and even the irrational belief that housing
prices would continue to increase regardless of such fundamentals. 35
Professors Levitin and Wachter have convincingly argued that an
underappreciated explanation for the housing bubble is what they describe as
an excessive supply of housing credit caused by information asymmetries in
private-label mortgage securitization that allowed financial institutions to
underprice risk at the expense of investors.36 At the same time, it is well
documented that during the early to mid-2000s, there was a proliferation of
home-finance products such as adjustable-rate mortgages with artificially low
teaser rates, self-amortizing loans, and other options that were unsustainable
Andrew W. Lo, Reading About the Financial Crisis: A Twenty-One-Book Review, 50 J.
EcoN. LIT. 151 (2012) (reviewing academic and popular accounts of the broader economic
crisis).
31 See EDWARD M. GRAMLICH, SUBPRIME MORTGAGES: AMERICA'S LATEST BOOM AND

BUST 13-17 (2007); Richard K. Green & Susan M. Wachter, The American Mortgage in
Historical and International Context, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 97 (2005). As Green and
Wachter point out, there were a number of significant developments in the market and
regulatory structure for home mortgages in this period, notably a credit crisis in the late
1960s that led to the privatization of Fannie Mae and the creation of Freddie Mac, as well as
the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s. See id. at 97-99.
32 See ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION: How TODAY'S GLOBAL FINANCIAL
CRISIS HAPPENED, AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 33 fig.2.1 (2008) (reviewing data).
* See Levitin & Wachter, supra note 30, at 1179. As Levitin and Wachter observe,

"[t]here is little consensus" on causation. See id. at 1179.
34 SHILLER, supra note 32, at 32.
3 See Levitin & Wachter, supra note 30, at 1212-28.
" See id. at 1203-10, 1228-32. Levitin and Wachter argue that there were actually
distinct phases in the period that is considered the housing bubble, with fundamental market
forces explaining more of the price expansion from roughly 1997 through 2003, and only
thereafter did housing prices become decoupled from those fundamentals. Id. at 1203-10.
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and hard to understand for many borrowers.37 In other words, opacity in both
the terms of loan origination and in the mortgage-securitization process were
key factors in the boom, just as they would turn out to be in the bust.
Starting in 2006, a series of interconnected phenomena started a "cascade"
that rapidly reversed this price spike. Interest rates began to rise at the same
time that home prices began leveling off, and even declining in some local
markets.38 This generated a negative feedback loop that reduced demand in the
communities where price appreciation had been most concentrated, at the same
time that borrowers were experiencing significant interest-rate resets in
adjustable-rate mortgages.39 The downward spiral this sparked in the housingfinance sector rapidly radiated out to freeze credit markets more generally, as
financial institutions exposed to now unpriceable debt holdings began to fail,
causing a global economic crisis that continues today. 40
Beyond the macroeconomic consequences of this residential real estate
expansion and collapse, the perhaps inevitable legal fallout has loomed large,
as distressed loans originated during the boom, particularly those that were
securitized, have generated a significant surge in foreclosures and mortgagerelated bankruptcies. 41 Over the past five years, there have been on average
3

See, e.g., GRAMLICH, supra note 31, at 17-22; U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,

GAO-1 1-656, MORTGAGE

REFORM: POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF PROVISIONS INTHE DODD-FRANK
ACT ON HOMEBUYERS AND THE MORTGAGE MARKET 1, 8-9 (2011) (stating that the

foreclosure crisis has been "fueled in part by the proliferation of mortgage products in the
early to mid-2000s that have come to be associated with poorer loan performance," such as
"mortgages with interest rates that increased sharply after a few years, did not require a
down payment or full documentation of income, or allowed borrowers to defer principal and
interest payments, increasing their indebtedness over time"); cf id. at 11 (observing that
subprime and near-prime originations accounted for nearly forty percent of the market in
2006).
38 Cf JAMES R. BARTH ET AL., THE RISE AND FALL OF THE U.S. MORTGAGE AND CREDIT
MARKETS: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET MELTDOwN 73-74 (2009)
(recounting that "[flalling prices unleashed a cascade of consequences").
39 See id. at 74-99 (explaining that "borrowers with [adjustable-rate mortgages] were
unable to refinance before their rates reset," and soon the credit crunch "spilled over to the
real economy," with unemployment rising "as recessionary effects set in").

See Davidson & Dyal-Chand, supra note 26, at 1627-29.
See supra text accompanying notes 1-5. Homeowners in default on their mortgage
loans often file Chapter 13 bankruptcy, despite the fact that home-mortgage debt is not
dischargeable in such a proceeding. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2006) (allowing debtors to
"modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a
security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence"). Indeed, a 2001
study by the Consumer Bankruptcy Project concluded that 75% of Chapter 13 cases were
filed by homeowners, whereas only 30% of Chapter 7 cases were filed by homeowners.
Katherine Porter, Misbehavior and Mistake in Bankruptcy Mortgage Claims, 87 TEX. L.
REv. 121, 141 n.127 (2008) (indicating that the Consumer Bankruptcy Project data is on file
with the author). Approximately 400,000 homeowners file Chapter 13 each year. Id. at 166;
see also QuarterlyNon-Business Filings by Chapter(1994-2012), AM. BANKR. INST., http://
40
41
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more than 1.5 million foreclosure starts every year, 42 and nearly four million
completed foreclosures. 43 This mortgage distress, moreover, has been
concentrated in states that saw some of the largest price appreciation during the
boom, thus magnifying the effect of the crisis in certain regions. 44 And the
crisis in the legal system left by the aftermath of the housing crisis is
continuing. Indeed, by some estimates, roughly five million homes are
expected to go through foreclosure in the next three years, 45 which means that
the after-effects of the crisis are likely to continue to be felt in the courts for
some time to come. 46
The Structural Interface Between Primary and Secondary Mortgage
Markets
In order to understand the formalist turn in the jurisprudence as courts have
confronted this continuing aftermath, it is worth pausing briefly to note some
salient functional features of mortgage securitization. 47 Although the line
between "primary" and "secondary" mortgage markets has become
increasingly indeterminate, it is still possible to discuss two relatively distinct
arenas in which single-family residential financing transactions play out. 4 8 The
primary market involves the origination and servicing of mortgages, where
individual borrowers take out purchase-money and home-equity loans in ways
that, on the surface, have not changed drastically since the standardization of
2.

www.abiworld.org/AM/AMTemplate.cfmn?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisp
lay.cfm&CONTENTID=66157 (last visited Jan. 31, 2013).
42Jonathan Stempel, Top Massachusetts CourtLimits ForeclosureRelief REUTERS (June
22, 2012, 4:15 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/22/us-massachusetts-foreclosur
es-idUSBRE85L18I20120622 (citing data indicating an annual average of about 1.6 million
foreclosure starts).
43 See supra text accompanying note 4.
1 See supra note 5.
45 Editorial, Still Depressed,After All These Years, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2012, at SR12
(explaining that, in addition to these five million homes, there are five million homes in the
United States that have already been foreclosed upon). About 1.8 million foreclosures were
filed in 2012, and over 1.5 million homes were in some stage of foreclosure at the end of
2012. 1.8 Million U.S. Propertieswith ForeclosureFilingsin 2012, supra note 5.
46 Although the number of underwater homes has been decreasing, 10.9 million, or 26%
of mortgage holders, owe at least 25% more on their homes than they are worth. 1.8 Million
U.S. Propertieswith ForeclosureFilings in 2012, supra note 5.
47 See generally Kurt Eggert, The Great Collapse: How Securitization Caused the

Subprime Meltdown, 41 CONN. L. REv. 1257 (2009); Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A.
McCoy, Turning A Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of PredatoryLending, 75 FORDHAM L.
REv. 2039 (2007). On the structure of mortgage markets more generally, see Green &
Wachter, supra note 31.
48 See Ingrid Gould Ellen, John Napier Tye & Mark A. Willis, The Secondary Marketfor
Housing Finance in the United States: A Brief Overview, in THE AMERICAN MORTGAGE
SYSTEM: CRISIS AND REFORM 7, 8-17 (Susan M. Wachter & Marvin M. Smith eds., 2011).
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the thirty-year fixed-rate mortgage in the New Deal. 4 9 In the secondary market,
which is a relatively recent innovation in the long history of mortgages, 50 those
loans are packaged and sold into trusts that then issue - and create a market for
the subsequent trading of - securities backed by mortgage debt.51
Securitization thus turns a relatively long-term, illiquid payment stream due on
residential mortgages into a relatively liquid asset, designed to shield investors
from claims arising from the original loan as well as to provide bankruptcy
remoteness. 52
The basic structure of securitization is not hard to describe, although the
details can vary significantly in different transactional contexts.53 Essentially,
what are called "private label" securities begin when home loans are
originated, directly by a lender or through a mortgage broker. The individual
loan is then recorded and sold to an intermediary, or "sponsor," who then
typically packages the loan into one or more pools that are sold to a specialpurpose entity, or "depositor." 54 The final step involves transferring the loans
into a trust governed by pooling and servicing or trust agreements.55 At each
49 Beyond the basics, individual lending, of course, has changed significantly in many
respects, whether in terms of the structure of the institutions making home loans, the
automation of credit evaluation, the rise of the mortgage brokerage industry, or other
examples. That said, borrowers still apply for and receive individual loans in ways that
would have been relatively familiar to home buyers two or three generations ago.
5 The early post-War expansion of homeownership, with its expanding mortgage
market, developed with a relatively modest secondary market. To get a sense of the scale of
the current market, as of the third quarter of 2012 over $6 trillion dollars (with a "t") of
residential mortgage-related securities were outstanding. See SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS.
Ass'N, RESEARCH QUARTERLY: 3Q 2012, at 8 (2012), available at http://www.sifma.org/Wor
kArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=8589941159.
s See Eggert, supra note 47, at 1266. Some loans are still held in portfolio, but the bulk
of all loans are now sold to investors or securitizers. Levitin, supranote 22, at 584-85.
52 See, e.g., Levitin, supra note 22, at 583 (explaining that the "originate-to-distribute
(OTD) model" based on securitization was "designed to increase liquidity"); John Patrick
Hunt, Richard Stanton & Nancy Wallace, The End of Mortgage Securitization? Electronic
Registration as a Threat to Bankruptcy Remoteness 16 (Aug. 12, 2011) (unpublished
manuscript available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/stanton/papers/pdf/mers.pdf)
(describing how the process of securitization creates a depositor "designed to be
independent from the sponsor and to have no liabilities or risk of bankruptcy"). One of the
challenges arising from securitization with respect to individual lenders is that because pools
are packaged and repackaged, a single pool of loans, or portions of pools, may be traded in
highly fragmented and specialized segments. See Levitin, supra note 22, at 584-85.
5 See Anna Gelpern & Adam J. Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts: Workout
Prohibitions in Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, 82 S. CAL. L. REv. 1075, 1078-79
(2008).
14 Mortgages are now often recorded not in the name of the originator, but rather in the
name of MERS as nominee for the originator. See infra text accompanying notes 57-60.
s Once loans are pooled in the trust, the trustee, often a bank, administers the trust's
assets and interacts with borrowers, typically through loan servicers. See Gelpern & Levitin,
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step, if done correctly, the transfer - from originator to intermediary to
of the mortgage note
depositor to trust - should be evidenced by an assignment 56
and the mortgage or deed of trust associated with the note.
57
A foundational, and of late controversial, element in the expansion of the
secondary market has been the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.,
58
a company known more generally as MERS. MERS maintains a private
registry of mortgages, and its members typically list it on the mortgage as
"nominee" for the lender, its successors, and assigns. MERS then remains the
name of the mortgage holder in the public records. The relevant member
registers a given loan with MERS and then, when either servicing rights or
beneficial ownership in the mortgage loan is transferred, notifies MERS to
update the registry. 9 MERS was arguably critical to creating the kind of
secondary market that exploded during the housing boom, not only because it
reduced the transaction costs of transferring the ownership of mortgage debt
and servicing rights, but also because it created a forum for trading rights in the
secondary market.60
The caselaw that has found fault with the securitization process in individual
foreclosure and bankruptcy cases has spawned an ongoing and vigorous debate
about whether that process was meant to comply with state-level formalities
related to the assignment of notes and mortgages and has raised questions of
lender authority and identity.6 1 Indeed, securitization has been criticized as

supranote 53, at 1088-89.
16 This, of course, is the heart of the contention in most of the cases that have emerged
since the crisis on the intersection between securitization and traditional foreclosure and
bankruptcy practice. See infra Part I.B. The response of securitization trustees on behalf of
lenders has often been that most residential mortgage notes are negotiable instruments under
the Uniform Commercial Code, and that the typical securitization trust provides for
negotiation by "indorsement" and transfer of possession, with an assignment of the related
mortgage outside of the MERS context. See AM. SECURITIZATION FORUM, TRANSFER AND
ASSIGNMENT OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LOANS IN THE SECONDARY MARKET 3 (2010),
availableat http://www.americansecuritization.com/uploadedfiles/asf white-paper_ 1116
10.pdf.
1 See Marsh, supra note 24, at 23 (stating that "MERS has been a controversial
innovation," partly because of the concern that "the legal fiction of MERS's status as the
'mortgagee of record,' when it holds no beneficial interest in the property, is irreconcilable
with mortgage law"); infra Part I.B.2.a.
" See generally Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure,Subprime Mortgage Lending, and
the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 78 U. CIN. L. REv. 1359 (2010); Phyllis K.
Slesinger & Daniel McLaughlin, Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 31 IDAHO L.
REv. 805 (1995).
59 See Slesinger & McLaughlin, supra note 58, at 806-07.
60 MERS has a role in the origination of about six in ten U.S. mortgage loans and appears
to be the mortgagee of record on more than sixty million mortgages. See Bank of N.Y. v.
Silverberg, 926 N.Y.S.2d 532, 539 (App. Div. 2011).
61 The American Securitization Forum, an industry group, has defended the formal
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creating an unmanageable "alphabet soup" problem, 62 and a number of vexing
questions have arisen about the intersection of negotiable instruments law
under the Uniform Commercial Code and state real-property-recordation and
priority rules.63
The process of securitization, however, is no more inherently complex than
many areas of transactional practice, and it is an unfortunate and somewhat
facile misconception to frame the challenges arising in foreclosure as a
question of opacity. Rather, the tensions between the primary and secondary
markets are more a question of traditional real-property-focused norms in the
former, and a structure created to facilitate liquidity in the latter. The emerging
jurisprudence of mortgage distress has brought those tensions to the fore, as
loans securitized during the housing boom have faced default. It is to that
caselaw that we now turn.
B.

Patterns in the EnsuingMortgage DistressJurisprudence
In the aftermath of the housing crisis, the primary battleground for resolving
mortgage problems has been judicial foreclosure, although there have also
been some notable non-judicial foreclosure developments," as well as ripples

validity of the typical securitization process in a white paper it released in 2010. See
generally AM. SECURITIZATION FORUM, supra note 56.
62 See Timothy A. Froehle, Note, Standing in the Wake
of the ForeclosureCrisis: Why
ProceduralRequirements Are Necessary to Prevent FurtherLoss to Homeowners, 96 IOwA
L. REv. 1719, 1733 (2011) (citing 0. Max Gardner III, The Alphabet Problem and the
Pooling and Servicing Agreements, CREDIT SLIPS (Aug. 14, 2009, 12:59 PM), http://www.cr
editslips.org/creditslips/2009/08/the-alphabet-problem-and-the-pooling-and-servicing-agree
ments.html) (pointing out "the complexity of maintaining proper documentation and
complying with all the legal requirements for proper conveyances up the chain" of
assignments and negotiations, which bankruptcy lawyer 0. Max Gardner III terms the
"Alphabet Problem").
6 See Dale A. Whitman, How Negotiability Has Fouled Up the Secondary Mortgage
Market, and What to Do About It, 37 PEPP. L. REv. 737, 741-42 (2010) (arguing that it is
nearly impossible to determine negotiability, that the maker of a negotiable note can lose
claims against originators, and that the delivery requirements of negotiability are
incompatible with the global secondary market).
I There are two primary forms of foreclosure, judicial and non-judicial. In judicial
foreclosure a party seeking to foreclose files a legal action and the court adjudicates matters
such as standing, default, and amount of the lien, and then supervises a judicial sale of the
collateral. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 9, § 7.11, at 806-08. In non-judicial
foreclosure a trustee or mortgagee with a power of sale follows statutory requirements for
notice and sale, but does not need to involve a court. Id. at 845-49. Borrowers can
affirmatively contest non-judicial foreclosures, typically seeking injunctive relief. Id. A
third method, strict foreclosure, is still available in a handful of states, although primarily
for specialized circumstances, such as where a mortgagee foreclosed and neglected to join a
junior lienholder with a right of redemption. Id. at 801-06.
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in bankruptcy proceedings. 65 The decisions that have emerged since the crash
have yielded several common themes under various procedural headings that,
collectively, highlight the informality that pervaded the secondary market
66
before the crash and a new formalism that is taking hold in its wake.
1. Formalism Emerging
Standing, Chain-of-Assignments, and Other Challenges in Judicial
Foreclosures
In a number of recent cases, the failure of banks to properly complete or
document mortgage assignments has proven fatal to subsequent foreclosure
actions. These deficiencies have sometimes been framed as a question of
standing and real party in interest, and sometimes framed as a question of
failure of proof on a substantive element needed for foreclosure (which is to
say, did the lender actually have the right to foreclose at the time it did?).
67
The case that first brought significant attention to these problems was
68 In these consolidated
Judge Boyko's decision in In re Foreclosure Cases.
cases, Deutsche Bank, as trustee, sought to foreclose on fourteen securitized
mortgages held in trust. In each case, the mortgage and note attached to the
foreclosure complaint referred to the originator, not the party before the
court. 69
a.

65 For general discussions of the emerging caselaw, see Victoria V. Corder, Homeowners
and Bondholders as Unlikely Allies: Allocating the Costs of Securitization in Foreclosure,
BANKING &FIN. SERVICES POL'Y REP., May 2011, at 19, 22-24 [hereinafter Corder, Unlikely
Allies]; Victoria V. Corder, Note, When Securitization Complicates the Issue: What Are the
Homeowner's Defenses to Foreclosure?, 16 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & Soc. JUsT. 299,
311-21 (2009); Froehle, supra note 62, at 1732, 1734-40; and David R. Greenberg,
Comment, Neglected Formalities in the Mortgage Assignment Process and the Resulting
Effects on ResidentialForeclosures,83 TEMP. L. REv. 253, 265-77 (2010).
66 Cf RAO ET AL., supra note 7, at 113 ("Foreclosure laws have been built on a
foundation of state real property, contract, and commercial laws. The explosion in
securitized mortgage debt occurred with little regard for the details of these fundamental
state laws.").
67 See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Foreclosures Hit a Snag for Lenders, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 15, 2007, at Cl.
68 In re Foreclosure Cases, Nos. 1:07CV2282, 07CV2532, 07CV2560, 07CV2602,
07CV2631, 07CV2638, 07CV2681, 07CV2695, 07CV2920, 07CV2930, 07CV2949,
07CV2950, 07CV3000, 07CV3029, 2007 WL 3232430 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2007); see also
In re Foreclosure Cases, 521 F. Supp. 2d 650, 654 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (giving plaintiffs in
twenty-seven diversity-jurisdiction foreclosure cases thirty days to prove their standing and
the court's subject matter jurisdiction, given that evidence submitted with the relevant
complaints called those requirements into question).
69 In re Foreclosure Cases, 2007 WL 3232430, at *1 (observing that plaintiffs had
attached affidavits in the consolidated complaints that recited "the averment that Plaintiff is
the owner of the Note and Mortgage, without any mention of an assignment or trust or
successor interest").
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Citing the basic Article III standing requirement of injury in fact, the district
court in this diversity action ordered the lenders to submit either affidavits
indicating that they were the original mortgagees or copies of the executed
assignments demonstrating that they were the holders and owners of the note
and mortgage as of the date the complaint was filed. 70 The subsequently filed
documents showed the name of the originator, not the foreclosing lender, and
affidavits filed in response to further prodding by the court simply recited that
there had been present assignments, clearly not prepared or executed at the
time of any actual assignment.71 In a biting opinion highlighting what the judge
perceived to be a cavalier attitude on the part of lender counsel, the court
dismissed the actions. 72
In re ForeclosureCases commenced a series of decisions involving judicial
foreclosures that highlighted problems in the assignment of notes and

mortgages in securitization. In Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Taylor, for

example, a New York court dismissed a foreclosure where the relevant
assignment was executed a month after the case was filed. 7 3 In Deutsche Bank
National Trust Co. v. McRae, another New York court held that the assignment
of a mortgage did not constitute proof of the assignment of the related note. 74
Several similar cases have been framed less in terms of assignment
problems and more as closely related challenges to the enforceability of the
note as a negotiable instrument. For example, in Bank of New York v.
Raftogianis, the court dismissed a foreclosure because the plaintiff bank had
failed to establish that, at the time of the foreclosure complaint, it or an agent
had possession of the note as required by New Jersey law.7 5 Other cases have
70

Id.

"

Id. at *2.

72

This case has achieved notoriety, both because it was one of the first
post-boom

shocks to the system of foreclosure, but also because Judge Boyko ended with a memorable
summation. As the Court put it, "'Fluidity of the market' - 'X' dollars, 'contractual
arrangements between institutions and counsel' - 'X' dollars, 'purchasing mortgages in bulk
and securitizing' - 'X' dollars, 'rush to file, slow to record after judgment' - 'X' dollars,
'the jurisdictional integrity of United States District Court'- 'Priceless."' Id. at *3 n.3.
n Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Taylor, 843 N.Y.S.2d 495, 496-97 (Sup. Ct. 2007);
see also Herrera v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 127 Cal. Rptr. 3d 362, 372 (Ct. App.
2011) (requiring the foreclosing lender to demonstrate the chain of title for the deed of trust
in order to conduct the trustee sale); Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 134
Ohio St. 3d 13, 2012-Ohio-5017, 979 N.E.2d 1214, 1220, at 1 28 (finding no jurisdiction
because the lender had not been assigned the mortgage or the note until after it filed the
foreclosure action); LaSalle Bank N.A. v. Aheam, 875 N.Y.S.2d 595, 597-98 (App. Div.
2009) (dismissing for lack of standing where the mortgage had not been assigned to the
plaintiff at the time of the foreclosure filing).
74 Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. McRae, 894 N.Y.S.2d 720, 722
(Sup. Ct. 2010).
7 Bank ofN.Y. v. Raftogianis, 13 A.3d 435, 449-50, 458 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
2010)
(explaining that naming MERS as nominee did not make MERS the lender and therefore did
not separate the note from the mortgage and, thus, MERS could not effectively transfer the
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similarly focused on whether the purported agent for the lender was, in fact,
authorized to act.76 These cases continue to be handed down at a regular
pace. 77
b. Bankruptcy
Several cases involving problems in securitization have also arisen in
bankruptcy, in contexts where lenders seek relief from the automatic stay in
order to then proceed to foreclose. 78 In the case of In re Maisel, for example,
the court found that the trustee for a securitization trust was not a "party in
interest" under the Bankruptcy Code because the only assignment brought
79
before the court was dated four days after the filing of the motion for relief.
Other cases in bankruptcy have highlighted chain-of-title problems, such as
note
whether assignment of a mortgage in the absence of an assignment of the
80
is sufficient to confer standing to seek relief from the automatic stay. And
interest in the mortgage to the plaintiff). But see, e.g., Citimortgage, Inc. v. Ramirez, No. A3540-07, 2009 WL 537072, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 5, 2009) (holding that
where the foreclosing bank had a copy of the assignment and a certified copy of the note
and mortgage, it could foreclose on the home).
76 In HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Valentin, for example, the originator recorded the
borrowers' mortgage, then recorded an assignment of the note and mortgage to HSBC. No.
15968/07, 2008 WL 239932, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 30, 2008), affd as modified, 900
N.Y.S.2d 350 (App. Div. 2010). When Ocwen Loan Servicing sought to foreclose, the court
dismissed because Ocwen could not establish any relationship to the originator or record
holder of the mortgage. Id. at *2-3 (stating that an employee of Ocwen had submitted an
affidavit asserting that she was the "servicing agent and attorney in fact to the holder of the
bond and mortgage sought to be foreclosed," but that nothing from the holder was
submitted).
77 See, e.g., NTex Realty, LP v. Tacker, 275 P.3d 147, 149 (Okla. 2012) (finding that
there was a question of fact as to when the foreclosing entity became a holder permitted to
enforce the note).
78 On creditor lack of adherence to bankruptcy formalities, see Porter, supra note 41, at
147 (documenting the number of creditors in actions involving foreclosure who could not
demonstrate proof of ownership). Failure to include the promissory note and the appropriate
documentation for all claims and charges impedes debtors from understanding why they
owe certain fees and whether those fees are legal and accurate. Id. at 146-47, 153. Despite
inadequate servicing, debtors rarely object to vague and suspicious fees, resulting in their
overpayment of servicers and increased risk of foreclosure. Id. at 171-72, 178.
79 In re Maisel, 378 B.R. 19, 21 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007). In the case, the court then
granted the motion notwithstanding this procedural defect, because the debtors had indicated
their intent to surrender the underlying property at issue. Id. at 22. Additionally, courts have
held that a foreclosing party does not have standing if it cannot trace the ownership of the
mortgage and note from the original holder to itself. See, e.g., In re Hayes, 393 B.R. 259,
267-68 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2008).
911,
80 See, e.g., Veal v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc. (In re Veal), 450 B.R. 897,
to
failure
for
stay
from
relief
seek
to
standing
bank
(denying
2011)
Cir.
9th
(B.A.P.
917-18
demonstrate that it was a "holder" or otherwise "entitled to enforce" the note, even though it
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unlike most post-crisis cases, which have been dismissed without prejudice,81
one bankruptcy court went so far as to eliminate the mortgage debt in response
to an inadequate proof of claim. 82
c. Non-JudicialForeclosures
Non-judicial foreclosures would seem at first blush to be an arena in which
formalization would find less traction, given that challenging such a
foreclosure requires affirmative litigation on the part of a borrower, and the
overwhelming majority of foreclosures never yield litigation.83 Nonetheless,
one of the more significant examples of new formalism arose in a non-judicial
foreclosure case, U.S. Bank N.A. v. Ibanez.84 This case involved foreclosures
on two similar securitized mortgages by U.S. Bank and Wells Fargo. The
relevant mortgages had been originated by other entities and then, through
several intermediate steps, eventually assigned into trusts for securitization.8 5
In each case the banks, as trustees, had purchased the mortgaged properties at
their own foreclosure sales and then sought to quiet title in subsequent
actions.86 In both instances, however, the relevant assignments had not been

had been transferred the mortgage)
1 See infra text accompanying notes 205-06.

In re Parades, No. 09-22261, 2009 WL 3571536, at *1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 9,
2009); see also Gretchen Morgenson, If Lenders Say "The Dog Ate Your Mortgage," N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 25, 2009, at BUI (reporting that the decision "wiped out a $461,263 mortgage
debt on the property").
83 See Julie Schmit, Foreclosure Fight Tracks
Paper Trail; "Show Me the Note"
Strategy Gives Homeowners Leverage, USA TODAY, Dec. 21, 2010, at 1B (stating that more
than nine out of ten of home-mortgage borrowers in default do not challenge their
foreclosures). Non-judicial foreclosures are allowed in over thirty jurisdictions, including
the District of Columbia, although in some of those jurisdictions judicial foreclosure is still
the local custom. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 9, § 7.19, at 845 & n. 1.
84 941 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 2011). Ibanez was unusual compared to many non-judicial
foreclosures in that the servicers in the paired cases brought actions to quiet title to the
properties, apparently because there was doubt about the adequacy of notice for each
foreclosure sale. Id. at 44 n.6. The foreclosures were not, however, unusual in that the
foreclosing bank in each instance was also the successful bidder at the sale. See id.; NELSON
& WHITMAN, supra note 9, § 8.8, at 995-96 (discussing the advantages that lenders have at
foreclosure sales of the collateral they hold). The mortgagors did not initially contest the
action, and it was the land court judge who raised the assignment issues. See Ibanez, 941
N.E.2d at 44-45.
85 The initial assignment of the mortgage at issue in
the U.S. Bank case (the Ibanez
mortgage) had been recorded prior to the foreclosure, but subsequent assignments were not;
more than a year after the foreclosure sale another entity executed and then recorded an
assignment to U.S. Bank. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d at 46-47. Similarly, for the mortgage at issue
in the Wells Fargo case, the assignment from the originator to Wells Fargo was not executed
or recorded until about ten months after the sale. Id. at 47-49.
86 Id. at 44.
82
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executed or recorded at the time the foreclosure was noticed and the sales took
place.87
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court began its analysis by reaffirming
the proposition that a party seeking to act pursuant to a power-of-sale clause in
a mortgage must 'strictly adhere[]"' to the statutory requirements authorizing
that sale, notably that the party foreclosing be "'the mortgagee or his
executors, administrators, successors or assigns."' 8 8 Similarly, the notice
required for a foreclosure sale must properly identify "the holder of the
mortgage." 89 Both banks asserted their authority to exercise the power of sale
based on other, non-direct assignment documents related to the securitization
of the mortgages, but the court rejected each one of them as insufficient to
show proper assignment. 90
91
The most recent iteration in Massachusetts, Eaton v. FannieMae, involved
the opposite problem of the one that plagued the servicers in Ibanez. In Ibanez,
the Supreme Judicial Court was faced with holders of the relevant mortgage
notes who could not demonstrate that they had received an assignment of their
92
respective mortgages at the initiation of the foreclosures. In Eaton, by
contrast, the court confronted a properly assigned mortgage that was sought to
93
be foreclosed upon by a party who was not the holder of the underlying note.
For the loan in question, MERS had served as the nominee for the originating
94
lender; then, MERS had assigned the mortgage, but not the note. The
Supreme Judicial Court held that to validly foreclose under a power-of-sale
provision in the mortgage, the party must hold the mortgage and must either
95
hold the note or be acting as an authorized agent of the note holder.
87

There had been a third case in the lower court involving LaSalle Bank, but in that case

the trial court concluded that the foreclosure had not been rendered invalid by failure to
record an assignment because the bank was, in fact, the holder by assignment at the time. Id.
at 45 n.8.
88 Id. at 50 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 183, § 21).
89 Id.
9 Id. at 51-52. The court noted that a recordable assignment is not necessarily required,
even if a recorded assignment is the "better practice." The court explained, however, that
there must still be proof of assignment, and not simply, for example, a trust agreement
referencing the mortgage. Id. at 53. The court also rejected arguments that assignments in
blank constituted effective assignments, that the mortgage followed the note, and that postsale assignments should be given retroactive effect. Id. at 53-54.
91 969 N.E.2d 1118 (Mass. 2012).
92 See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
93 Eaton, 969 N.E.2d at 1120.
94 Id. at 1121-22. Eaton arose out of an eviction action by Fannie Mae after it had
received an assignment of the winning bid at the foreclosure auction. Id. at 1122-23. The

homeowner defended against the eviction action by challenging the validity of the
foreclosure. Id.
9 Id. at 1129-31. The court, however, applied the decision prospectively, that is, only to
foreclosure actions subsequently initiated (although apparently applicable to all outstanding
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Cases such as Ibanez and Eaton have already begun to generate waves of
reaction in other non-judicial foreclosure states. 96 Together with the
reinvigoration of formality in judicial foreclosure and bankruptcy, these cases
underscore how broadly technical regularity has become an issue in every
aspect of mortgage distress litigation.97
2. Anticipations of, and Reactions to, Formalism
This new formalism was prefigured by structural changes in the process of
securitization and post hoc reactions, both of which have become fodder for
additional legal challenges.
a. MERS in the Courts
Although many of the claims raised against MERS are not unique, the
company bears special mention in any discussion of the legal consequences of
secondary mortgage market informality.98 In a number of individual cases,
borrowers have unsuccessfully challenged the validity of the MERS process of
recording as nominee, 99 although enforcement and regulatory actions have
gained some traction. 00 Borrowers have had some success, however, raising

mortgages). Id. at 1133.
96 See Elizabeth Renuart, Property Title Trouble in Non-Judicial
Foreclosure States:
The Ibanez Time Bomb? 48-49, 55-56, 61-62, 69, 70-78 (Albany Law Sch., Working Paper
No. 38, 2012). It should be noted that Massachusetts is a so-called "title" theory state,
meaning that a mortgage nominally gives the mortgagee title to the collateral subject to
certain rights retained by the mortgagor. See Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d at 51. For most purposes,
the distinction between this theory and the more common "lien" theory approach, which
recognizes a mortgage as merely a lien, has disappeared. See Richard D. Gage, Note, A
Remedy Foreclosed?Mortgage Foreclosureand the Fair Debt Collection PracticesAct, 81
FORDHAM L. REv. 283, 298 (2012). Cases such as Eaton, however, do rely in part the
implications of title theory, which may limit their influence. See Eaton, 969 N.E.2d at 1124.
9 There is some indication that courts are also tightening up other general procedural
requirements in foreclosure. The New Jersey Supreme Court's high-profile decision in U.S.
Bank N.A. v. Guillaume, for example, held that U.S. National Bank violated the state's
foreclosure act by listing the name and address of the servicer rather than the name of the
lender in the notice of foreclosure. 38 A.3d 570, 583 (N.J. 2012). This was not a striking
development in isolation, but was closely watched in New Jersey and had an impact on
foreclosure practice in the run-up to the decision. See Sarah Portlock, Future of
Foreclosuresin N.J. Hinges on State Supreme Court Decision, STAR-LEDGER (Dec. 4, 2011,
7:00 AM), http://www.nj.com/business/index.ssf/2011/12/future-of foreclosuresin.njh.ht
ml (observing that "foreclosure filings" had "all but ground to a halt" pending the decision).
9 See supratext accompanying notes 57-59.
9 See, e.g., Beyer v. Bank of Am., 800 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1160-62 (D. Or. 2011)
(rejecting an argument that MERS acting as a mortgage beneficiary and the nominee
invalidated a foreclosure action).
100For example, the Office of Comptroller of the Currency filed a cease-and-desist
consent order in April 2011 finding that MERS failed to "exercise appropriate oversight ...
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the structure of MERS's overlapping roles in various aspects of securitization
as a defense to foreclosure.10
For example, borrowers have raised issues such as whether a servicer can
foreclose on behalf of MERS as a "nominee" with the allegation that MERS
was the owner of the note and mortgage.102 And, in Deutsche Bank National
Trust Co. v. Maraj, the court questioned MERS's practice of having the same
official execute assignments on behalf of both MERS and the receiving
entity. 0 3 Similarly, at least a few courts have been receptive to claims that
MERS lacks standing to file claims in bankruptcy given the ambiguities of
MERS's role as nominee and the lack of a direct interest retained by the
company in the mortgage. 104
b.

Banks and ServicersReact: The Problem of "Robosigning"

It seems evident that when confronted with record-keeping and assignment
problems, or perhaps out of longstanding habit, banks and their counsel turned
to various procedural methods to overcome formal requirements, including
affidavits related to lost notes, the amount of the obligation, the terms of
default, and the like. 105 Some of those techniques were undoubtedly legitimate,
and maintain adequate internal controls . . . with respect to the administration and delivery
of services to Examined Members." MERSCORP, Inc., Consent Order No. 2011-044,
Docket No. AA-EC-1 1-20, at 5 (OCC Apr. 13, 2011), availableat http://www.occ.gov/stati
c/enforcement-actions/ea20l1-044.pdf. Likewise, the New York Attorney General filed suit
against MERS in February 2012 for engaging in deceptive practices, misrepresenting facts
such as standing, using robosigners, and ultimately filing and encouraging its servicers to
file over 13,000 improper foreclosure proceedings against New York homeowners.
Complaint at 17-41, People v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 2768-2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Feb. 3, 2012), 2012 WL 361985.
"o1See Peterson, supra note 58, at 1380-86; Nolan Robinson, Note, The Case Against
Allowing Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems, Inc. (MERS) to Initiate Foreclosure
Proceedings, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621, 1645 (2011). When MERS acts as nominee for a
lender, it holds no legal or beneficial interest in the loan, although MERS does sometimes
take possession of notes. Peterson, supra note 58, at 1374-80.
102 See, e.g., Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Medina, No. 2:09-CV-00670, 2009
WL 4823387, at *2 (D. Nev. Dec. 4, 2009). As of July 22, 2011, MERS has prohibited its
members from foreclosing in the name of MERS. MERSCORP, INC., RULES OF MEMBERSHIP r.
8.1(d), at 26 (2012).
113 Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Maraj, No. 25981/07, 2008 WL 253926, at *2
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 31, 2008) (finding that the official claimed at various times to be the
vice president of MERS and an official of Deutsche Bank).
" See, e.g., Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Chong, No. 2:09-CV-00661, 2009
WL 6524286, at *3 (D. Nev. Dec. 4, 2009) (explaining that in order to have standing,
MERS must at a minimum substantiate its agency relationship with the real party in
interest).
105See Corder, Unlikely Allies, supra note 65, at 23 ("Mortgage servicers and
securitizing banks have gotten into the habit of filing a 'lost-note affidavit' when they fail to
present proof to the court that they own a mortgage. As commentators have observed, lost-
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but some banks and their counsel engaged in fairly widespread practices that
have charitably been called "robosigning," such as attesting to foreclosurerelated facts without first-hand knowledge. 106
Evidence on the extent of robosigning has been slow to emerge, but the
Inspector General for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) has provided some insight in a review of five of the
largest servicers for mortgages insured by the Federal Housing
Administration. 107 The HUD Inspector General reviewed files on claims over
the 2009 and 2010 fiscal years, and revealed practices of signing hundreds of
affidavits per day, with daily production goals set for the number of affidavits
to be processed. 08 One employee, for example, admitted signing "12- to 18inch stacks of documents at a time without a review," 09 and notaries were also
found to be deficient, with one servicer having had up to 1000 documents per
day notarized without witnessing the signature.o10
Practices bundled under the umbrella of robosigning have begun to show up
with some regularity as defenses in foreclosure litigation. In U.S. Bank N.A. v.
Kimball, for example, the Vermont Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a
foreclosure, in part because an affidavit submitted by the loan servicer
attempting to attest to a missing endorsement was not based on personal
knowledge."' Indeed, several banks and their counsel have been sanctioned

note affidavits are the rule in the industry rather than the exception .... ").
106 Although covering a number of questionable practices, robosigning is generally
understood as "an employee or agent of [a] servicer signing documents automatically
without a due diligence review or verification of the facts." OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S.
DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., MEM. No. 2012-KC-1801, CITIMORTGAGE, INC.,
FORECLOSURE AND
CLAIMS PROCESS REVIEW 1 n.2 (2012), available at
http://www.hudoig.gov/AuditReports/2012-KC-1801.pdf. The scandal that erupted when
these practices came to light led a number of prominent servicers and lenders, including
GMAC, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Goldman Sachs, to put a temporary halt to
foreclosures. Robo-Signing Puts Ownership of Thousands of Homes in Question, AOL REAL
ESTATE (Sept. 7, 2011, 10:22 AM), http://realestate.aol.com/blog/2011/09/07/robo-signing-p
uts-ownership-of-thousands-of-homes-in-question/.
107 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 106. The servicers under review by the HUD

Inspector General were the same five servicers that were involved in the National Mortgage
Settlement. See infra note 115.

1" OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T. OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., MEM. No. 2012FW-1802, BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION FORECLOSURE AND CLAIMS PROCESS REVIEW 6
(2012), availableat http://www.hudoig.gov/AuditReports/2012-FW-1 802.pdf.
109

Id

'10 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T. OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., MEM. No. 2012AT-1801, WELLS FARGO BANK FORECLOSURE AND CLAIMS PROCESS REVIEW 4

(2012), availableat http://www.hudoig.gov/Audit-Reports/2012-AT-1801.pdf.
I" U.S. Bank N.A. v. Kimball, 27 A.3d 1087, 1093 (Vt. 2011).
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for robosigning practices in relation to foreclosures,' 12 and several law firms
specializing in foreclosures have gone out of business.' 13
Moreover, as discussed below,"l 4 robosigning abuses led to one of the more
significant substantive - and procedural, with respect to servicing practices responses to the housing crisis, the so-called National Mortgage Settlement
between forty-nine state attorneys general and the federal government on one
side and the country's five largest loan servicers on the other.u 5 The roughly
$32 billion settlement, which grew out of state and federal investigations into
robosigning, is a rare, if limited, avenue to structural reform in the legacy
aspects of the housing crisis.' 16
3. Summary and Perspective
Before reflecting on what unites this caselaw, it is necessary to acknowledge
countercurrents in the jurisprudence that represent less strictly formalist
approaches." 7 Some courts, for example, have been forgiving of chain-ofassignment problems." 8 Lenders and servicers have also had some success
challenging the proposition that a party initiating foreclosure in non-judicial
112 See, e.g., HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Taher, No. 9230/09, 2011 WL 6445361, at *4
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 22, 2011) (imposing sanctions against HSBC Bank USA, N.A. as a
trustee and also sanctioning the bank's counsel because the bank's robosigning practices
were found to be frivolous and "completely without merit in law," the bank had asserted
"material factual statements that are false," and the bank's continuation of the action was "a
waste of judicial resources").
113See, e.g., Kimberly Miller, Thousands of ForeclosuresStill in Limbo One Year After
Stern Firm's Collapse, PALM BEACH POST, Apr. 2, 2012, at lA; Peter Lattman, Foreclosure
Firm Steven J. Baum to Close Down, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Nov. 21, 2011, 2:51 PM),
dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/11/2 1/foreclosure-firm-steven-j-baum-to-close-down/.
114 See infra text accompanying notes 190-97.
115The National Mortgage Settlement, announced on February 9, 2012 and approved on
April 5, 2012, involved Ally/GMAC, Bank of America, Citibank, JPMorgan Chase, and
Wells Fargo. See Fact Sheet: Mortgage Servicing Settlement, NAT'L MORTGAGE
SETTLEMENT, https://d9klfgibkcquc.cloudfront.net/MortgageServicingSettlementFact_S
heet.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2013).
116 See infra Part III.A.3.
117 To be clear, lenders succeeding in resisting claims based on the absence of
compliance with formal requirements is not necessarily the same thing as lenders obtaining
equitable relief. But in the spectrum between formalism and the flexibility that equity has
traditionally involved, these cases at least take a step back from strict formalism. Moreover,
as noted below, see infra text accompanying notes 222-25, this should not be read to suggest
that the courts, and other legal institutions, have entirely ignored other aspects of the
housing crisis; some courts have, in fact, validated claims based on substantive grounds of
fairness, although such decisions remain relatively isolated in comparison to the
proceduralist decisions.
"I See, e.g., U.S. Bank N.A. v. Knight, 90 So. 3d 824, 826 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)
(holding that the holder of a negotiable instrument had standing to foreclose, despite the fact
that the accompanying mortgage had not been transferred prior to initiation of the action).
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foreclosure states, such as California, must have the original note, 1 9 and some
courts have held that borrowers cannot challenge the authority of MERS to
initiate foreclosure proceedings.1 20 Likewise, some lenders in bankruptcy have
been able to demonstrate that they are real parties in interest, notwithstanding
confusion about who holds the note and mortgage. 12 1 That said, the turn in the
caselaw is discernible if uneven, and, given the backlog of distressed
mortgages arising from the pre-crash bubble, the trend shows little sign of
abating, even as lenders and servicers have begun to adjust to the new

jurisprudence.12 2
Several common themes emerge from the great many cases that do represent
the formalization trend, regardless of their procedural specifics. On a technical
level, a number of the cases focus on the relationship between the party
initiating the action and the actual holder of the mortgage and note,
underscoring the confusion that has emerged about who, precisely, holds any
given loan and related security interest at any given point in the securitization

1'9 See, e.g., Tina v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 08 CV 1233, 2008 WL
4790906, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2008) (holding that the California Civil Code "does not
[require] providing the original note prior to the sale" in a non-judicial foreclosure);
Debrunner v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d 830, 836 (Ct. App. 2012)
(holding, in an action challenging the assignment of a deed of trust without assignment of
the mortgage note, that California law does not require the party initiating non-judicial
foreclosure to be in possession of the note); see also Murphy v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC,
No. 12-1398, 2012 WL 5439284, at *2 (8th Cir. Nov. 8, 2012) (holding that homeowners
could not rely on a "show-me-the-note" theory to estop foreclosure proceedings where they
could not show with sufficient particularity that they suffered any harm as a result of
servicers proceeding in place of the original note holder).
120 See, e.g., Boyter v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. C 11-03943, 2012 WL 1144281,
at
*5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2012) (citing several cases).
121 For example, in In re Hwang, the district court determined that a servicer who had
sold the original note to Freddie Mac but remained the holder of the note was the "real party
in interest"; therefore, the bankruptcy court should have granted the servicer's motion to lift
the automatic stay and allowed the servicer to foreclose on the note. 438 B.R. 661, 665-66
(C.D. Cal. 2010), rev'g 396 B.R. 757 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2008).
122 Courts have also intervened in some instances to impose procedural requirements
directly on counsel in foreclosure cases, focusing on gatekeepers who can directly influence
the course of proceedings. New York, for example, recently issued an administrative order
that requires foreclosure actions to include a certification that counsel has personally
checked the accuracy of the claim, and mandates that a representative of the plaintiff attest
to the accuracy of the underlying documents. See Admin. OrderNo. AO/43 1/11 (N.Y. Chief
Admin. J. Mar. 2, 2011) (revising Admin. Order No. AO/548/10 (Oct. 20, 2010)), available
at http://www.nycourts.gov/attomeys/pdfs/AdminOrder_2010_10_20.pdf. New York courts
are currently divided on the validity of this new requirement. Compare Citimortgage, Inc. v.
McGee, 915 N.Y.S.2d 436, 438 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (enforcing the October 20, 2010
administrative order), with LaSalle Bank, N.A. v. Pace, 919 N.Y.S.2d 794, 803 (Sup. Ct.
2011) (finding that the Chief Administrative Judge's administrative order of October 20,
2010 was "legislative" in nature and therefore "void" under New York law).
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process. Similarly, several cases highlight concerns with the process of
assignment after origination, in terms of documenting, tracking, and recording
such transfers, likewise exposing a secondary market that appears to have
valued liquidity over careful procedural regularity. Finally, and crucially, the
cases reveal the particular mindset of originators, intermediaries, investors, and
servicers, for whom procedural requirements could be gamed, with courts
facilitating the flexibility necessary to realize their collateral, despite
procedural and technical hurdles. 123
These cases can thus be understood as the manifestation of a process of
lending and securitization in the home-finance sector that, at least until the
housing crisis hit, had come to rely on a measure of practical informality to
shape the market.124 For an individual lender holding a loan on its own book,
the importance of clear documentation was obvious. But the contemporary
secondary market was marked by a combination of MERS, relatively relaxed
assignment practices, and a foreclosure system that had come to rely at best on
automation and at worst on outright fraud.125 What these cases reveal is that
the superstructure of securitization flourished in the boom in no small measure
because of the flexibility inherent - by design or inadvertence - in the
secondary mortgage market, and that lender-side interests have tried, with
relatively little success, to preserve that flexibility when seeking to realize their
collateral in the context of the primary mortgage market.
II.

FORMALISM AND FLEXIBILITY IN MORTGAGE LAW

There are many ways to understand the significance of the foreclosure and
bankruptcy caselaw emerging in the wake of the housing crisis. This Part
The emerging jurisprudence arguably represents two closely related varieties of
formalization: the first in the property law sense that default rules are being enforced in
many respects, given the importance of the asset at issue; and the second in terms of
contractual formality, given that at least some of the requirements at issue reflect strict
compliance with loan terms and securitization documentation.
124 Moreover, there is an overlap between the rise of the kind of private-label
securitization that has proven most problematic in the post-crisis caselaw and the expansion
of the subprime and near-prime markets that were integral to that part of the secondary
market. See Davidson & Dyal-Chand, supra note 26, at 1626-27 (stating that "the most
exotic were also the most securitized").
125 Evidence that robosigning might be a symptom of a larger phenomenon can be found
in at least one investigation that has unearthed evidence of widespread noncompliance with
a range of formalities related to assignments and other requirements. See AEQUITAS
123

COMPLIANCE SOLUTIONS, INC., FORECLOSURE IN CALIFORNIA: A CRISIS OF COMPLIANCE 1

(2012), available at http://www.sfassessor.org/modules/showdocument.aspx?documentid=1
018 (finding, for example, potential violations of California law in eighty-four percent of
sampled mortgages). Examples of noncompliance include conflicting assignments of the
deed of trust, inconsistency between federal filings and recorded documents, incidences of
trustees and assignees signing for assignors, and assignment of the deed of trust after the
notice of default. Id. at 6-7.
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places the jurisprudence in the context of a centuries-old arms race between
borrowers and lenders over formalism and flexibility in mortgage law and in
property more generally - a tension that reflects the traditional domains of law
and equity. From the earliest days of the mortgage, this tension has shaped the
interaction between borrowers and lenders. Although the valence has not been
entirely uniform, it is possible to discern traces in that history of lenders
tending to invoke law's formal strictures and borrowers tending to invoke
equity's discretion. This Part traces that history, and highlights the ironies that
abound in contemporary lender antiformalism.126
A.

The Law-Equity Divide in Mortgage History

1. Law and Equity's Original Polarities
In many ways, the modem mortgage was born in reaction to the
consequences of the formalist strain evident in the procedural strictures of
early courts of law.' 27 A somewhat simplified version of this history is that
mortgages, with some variation, developed early in the Anglo-American
tradition as a form of conveyance.128 In late-twelfth-century England, around
the time of Glanvill, use of real property as collateral required a borrower to
convey the seisin in the land to the lender, who would hold it in "gage" as a
way to fix the obligations of the debtor.129 This would be a conveyance in fee
This Part and the next address contrasts between a series of oppositions: law and
equity; formalism and flexibility; and rules and standards. These are related in many ways,
but not precisely overlapping: the first derives from historical practice; the second from an
orientation to legal conflict; and the third from contrasting modes of decisionmaking. This is
not to conflate these dichotomies, but rather to acknowledge their interrelation in the context
of the resolution of mortgage distress.
127 See 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY
IN THE
126

UNITED STATES §§ 16.1-16.12 (A. James Casner ed., 1952); H.W. Chaplin, The Story of
Mortgage Law, 4 HARV. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1890). This history recapitulates to some extent
the earlier development of the Roman law of real security, which evolved from thefiducia, a
conveyance with agreement to reconvey upon repayment of the debt, to the pignus, in which
ownership transferred to the lender, but possession remained with the borrower, and finally
to the hypotheca, which provided only a security interest. William H. Lloyd, MortgagesThe Genesis of the Lien Theory, 32 YALE L.J. 233, 233 (1922).
128 Chaplin, supra note 127, at 6-7. There had been earlier adaptations by Norman judges
of Roman forms of security that resembled pledges of land without conveyance, including
foreclosure procedures that were equitable from the borrower's perspective. See id. at 5-6.
By the late twelfth century, however, the pledge of property in a manner that would convert
the pledge to an absolute fee interest in the lender had become common. Id. at 8-10. In this
way, the birth of the mortgage may actually have begun with equity, then capitulated to
formalism in law, and then returned to equity.
129 A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 141 (2d ed. 1986). The form of
conveyance varied over time - from a lease for years that would provide for vesting in fee if
the debt was not repaid by the end of the term, for example, to the fee simple subject to a
condition allowing reentry. Id. at 142. In a common form, the mortgagee, prior to the
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on condition that, if the debtor repaid the loan on the date and under the terms
provided, the debtor would have the right to reenter and terminate the
mortgagee's estate. 130
Over time, the possibility that the lender could take absolute title upon
default created substantial incentives for strategic behavior. If a borrower did
not repay the debt precisely on what became known as "law day" with the
exact repayment down to the farthing, the borrower would forfeit his collateral
entirely. 131 Thus, any value in the property above and beyond what could be
considered the security interest was transferred to the mortgagee.
As a result, borrowers turned to equity, and the Chancellor began to
alleviate the harsh consequences of strict common law formalism.132 Equity
initially allowed borrowers to raise traditional defenses such as fraud and
duress. 133 Eventually, borrowers who could repay at some point after law day
began to receive the right in equity more generally to redeem the collateral
conveyed at law, upon payment of principal and interest.134 This, of course,
became known as the equity of redemption and gives us the term "equity" for
the residual value in property above the amount collateralized. 135
Eventually, the flexibility that equity introduced to protect borrowers from
the harsher consequences of lending through the form of a defeasible
conveyance became onerous to lenders. At some point, it was only fair for the
equity of redemption to run out and for a borrower's inability to redeem to be
recognized. Accordingly, the Chancellor began allowing lenders to bring suit
to cut off, or "foreclose," the equity of redemption: hence the origins of
foreclosure practice as it stands today.136

condition being exercised, obtained the incidents of legal title, including the ability to pass
the title to heirs or devisees, the right to compensation for eminent domain, and potentially
even the right to vote associated with the property, among others. NELSON & WHITMAN,
supra note 9, §1.2, at 7. Early in this development, the lender used the right of possession to
collect rents (interest being considered usurious), but in later custom mortgagors could
retain possession. Id. at 7-8.
130 NELSON & WHITMAN, supranote 9, §1.2, at 7.
131 Id. at 8; see also AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 127, §16.6, at 20
(explaining that because the "value of the property almost invariably greatly exceeded the
amount of the debt," there was "a striking actual forfeiture and penalty even though the debt
was never enforced").
132 There is some indication that the courts of law had earlier independently interposed
essentially equitable considerations into this arrangement, AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY,
supra note 127, at 20-21; Chaplin, supra note 127, §16.6, at 9-10, although the essential
terms of the formalism/flexibility tension remained.
133 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 9, §1.3, at 8.
134 Id. at 8-9.
135 See id.
136 Id. at 9.
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2. Contemporary Echoes
The long historical back-and-forth between substantive protection for
borrowers through equity, on the one hand, and the nominal rights of lenders,
on the other, continues to echo in a number of doctrinal areas.' 37 Facing the
constraints of equity, for example, lenders have attempted to contract around
consumer protections and courts have, correspondingly, "jealously" guarded
against what is known as "clogging" the equity of redemption. 38 Thus, courts
regularly strike down attempts to bar the retention of ownership upon full
repayment prior to foreclosure, as well as a number of practices that offer
lenders what is considered a "collateral advantage."1 39
The equitable mortgage, moreover, often serves as a tool to police lenders'
attempts to evade consumer protections altogether through forms of
conveyance that purport not to involve financing. 140 Likewise, when lenders
seek to avoid the scrutiny of judicial management through power-of-sale
foreclosures, courts respond, albeit not often strongly, by allowing post hoc
review of the substantive fairness of the resulting sale, at least slightly more
often than in judicial foreclosures. 141
' Mortgage law as it was adopted in early U.S. history diverged in some notable ways
from British common law and equity - for example, by the early adoption of a lien theory of
mortgages that, in an equitable manner, reflected the substantive relationship between the
parties notwithstanding contrary terms in mortgage deeds. See AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY, supra note 127, § 16.13, at 31-32; cf Claire Priest, Creating an American
PropertyLaw: Alienability and Its Limits in American History, 120 HARv. L. REv. 385, 42125, 440-47 (2006) (exploring the transformation of the law governing the vulnerability of
land to creditor claims). These shifts, however, recapitulated the essential tension between
lender-oriented formalism and borrower-oriented flexibility, even if lien theory shifted the
conceptual foundations of the mortgage more clearly toward recognition of the interests of
the mortgagor.
1" See West v. Reed, 55 Ill. 242, 244 (1870) ("It is settled beyond controversy, that
contracts between mortgagor and mortgagee, for the purchase or extinguishment of the
equity of redemption, are regarded with jealousy by courts of equity, and will be set aside if
the mortgagee has, in any way, availed himself of his position to obtain an advantage over
the mortgagor."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES

§

3.1 (1997).

For a

historical perspective, see Bruce Wyman, The Clog on the Equity ofRedemption, 21 HARV.
L. REv. 459 (1908).
139Clogging claims often arise in contexts beyond simple contractual bars on
redemption, such as options to purchase that are dependent on the default of the borrower,
agreements to grant a deed in lieu of foreclosure upon future default, arrangements by which
borrowers agree to place a deed in escrow to be released upon default, certain aspects of
mezzanine financing, and other modem devices. For an excellent overview, see John C.
Murray, Clogging Revisited, 33 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 279 (1998).
140See Rashmi Dyal-Chand, From Status to Contract: Evolving Paradigms for

Regulating Consumer Credit, 73 TENN. L. REv. 303, 316 (2006); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES

§

3.2 (providing that a deed's conveyance, if intended as a

security for an obligation, shall "be deemed a mortgage").
141 See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 9,

§§

7.13-7.20, at 845-53.
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Statutory consumer protection for home finance breaks down similarly
along a more equitable focus on the substance of the transaction and on
142
For example,
procedural protection that resonates more in formalism.
statutory redemption periods, which take effect after foreclosure, recapitulate
143 By contrast, the bulk of
and extend the traditional equity of redemption.
federal regulation of home borrowing and purchase - such as the Truth in
Lending Act (TILA)'" and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
(RESPA)145 - has traditionally tended to focus on providing information to
consumers or ensuring related procedural protections at the outset of the
47
46
transaction, with an emphasis on disclosure.1 There are some exceptions,1
more
and the regulatory landscape in this arena is beginning to shift toward
substantive approaches with the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,
but that shift is still in its infancy. 148

There is also a long history of lender challenges to foreclosure moratoria, see, e.g.,
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 444-48 (1934) (upholding a
Depression-era state foreclosure moratorium statute), and resistance to both substantive
regulation in the primary mortgage market and procedural reforms, such as mandatory
mediation, that focus on the underlying substance of a given loan. Cf Walsh, supra note 21,
at 152.
143 See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 9, §8.4, at 977-78 (observing that
"approximately half the states authorize a statutory right of redemption which provides an
additional time period for mortgagors ... to pay a certain sum of money . .. to redeem the
142

title to the property"). Other statutory protections include the Fair Housing Act's provisions

protecting individuals buying, leasing, selling, holding, and conveying real property from
discrimination based on race, color, religion, national origin, sex, spousal income,
handicapped status, and familial status. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3603-3604 (2006). The defendant has
the burden of proving that business necessitated the use of one of these discriminatory
practices. 2 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 9, § 11.5, at 142.
'" 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2006) (requiring, for example, disclosure of credit terms to protect
consumers from the risks accompanying the uninformed use of credit).
145 12 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006) (requiring that information on the nature and cost of the
settlement process be given to consumers in a timely manner); id. § 2603(a) (requiring the
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection to publish one integrated disclosure for mortgage
loan transactions with clear and conspicuous disclosure of all charges to help the borrower
or lessee understand the transaction and all technical information in the disclosure); id. §
2604 (requiring that the informational booklets be distributed to borrowers).
"46 TILA, for example, mandates that lenders disclose certain financing-related
information, 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a)-(b), and RESPA similarly governs the information that
must be provided at a real estate closing, 12 U.S.C. § 2605(b).
147 Since 1994, the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act, which amended TILA,
has regulated the substantive terms of certain high-cost mortgage loans by barring shortterm balloon payments, negative amortization, certain prepayment penalties, default interest
rates, and other terms. Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-325, § 152(d), 108 Stat. 2190, 2191-2194 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1639).
141 See infra Part III.B.2.
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Today, lenders continue to have the arsenal of formalism at their grasp setting and enforcing the terms of payment deadlines, filing requirements,
servicing-related obligations (such as insurance), and other requirements that
reflect the approach of early lenders to law day. Borrowers, prior to the
housing crisis and since, continue to counter by invoking questions of fraud,
usury, and similar substantive claims about the terms or conditions of lending,
despite the rarity of decisions that validate these claims. As we shall see, this
makes the inversion evident in the aftermath of the housing crisis all the more
noteworthy.
B.

The Ineluctable Irony ofLender Antiformalism
The association between law-as-formalism and lender interests, on the one
hand, and debtor protection linked to the flexibility and substantive norms of
equity, on the other, is not entirely absolute in the history and structure of
mortgage law. Nonetheless, the preceding discussion should make clear that
there is a rough correspondence that traces back to the roots of contemporary
mortgage law.149 The valence of this tension, however, is being subverted in
the aftermath of the housing crisis, with borrowers holding lenders to account
for lack of formality and lenders trying to defend with what are, in essence, a
species of equitable arguments. 50 Understanding the irony that this turn
represents requires a pause to understand some of the reasons why the
historical valence developed and why it is now being subverted.
1. Reversing the Polarity
The divide between law and equity - in mortgages and more broadly - is
one variation of the familiar, longstanding debate about the relative merits and

149 It

is possible to trace a similar perennial tension between substantive fairness and

procedural regularity in the development of bankruptcy, reflected to some extent in
arguments between debtors and creditors that parallel the formalism/flexibility tension in
mortgage law. Although bankruptcy is a statutory proceeding, some of its more salient
features can be traced to historically equitable proceedings that involved the division of
limited funds, and it has become a truism of modern bankruptcy practice, however
overstated, that bankruptcy courts are courts of equity. See Marcia S. Krieger, "The
Bankruptcy Court is a Court ofEquity ": What Does That Mean?, 50 S.C. L. REv. 275, 276
(1999) (tracing and thoughtfully questioning repeated invocations of equity in bankruptcy as
a historical matter); id. at 295-97 (discussing particularly equitable aspects of bankruptcy
procedure in a system that combines legal and equitable aspects); cf Moringiello, supra
note 22, at 1605-06, 1621-22 (discussing equitable strains embodied in the Bankruptcy Code
and the interaction between bankruptcy and background state property law). When
bankruptcy proceedings address questions such as equitable subordination, and when they
grapple with questions such as fraudulent conveyances, the same type of conflict between
procedural regularity and contextual fairness that arises in mortgage distress litigation is
manifest.
Iso See supra Part I.B.
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implications of rules versus standards.15' Law, in this debate, is associated with
a substantive approach to doctrine that privileges a certain determinism that
can mask inequities in the name of formal norms. 15 2 Equity, by contrast, is
understood as a mode of decisionmaking that attends to questions of
substantive fairness between disputants despite contrary form, as reflected in
the oft-repeated maxim that "equity deems as done that which ought to be
done."l 53 Equity is thus sensitive to context and power dynamics between
disputants, and correspondingly brings a measure of flexibility to remedial
decisionmaking that can accommodate these concerns more easily than rules,
given equity's ability to reflect the granular texture of the underlying
interaction. 154
Another iteration of this tension can be understood as a contrast between
procedure and substance. This is a slightly trickier divide to discern because
formalism has its substance and equity its process. Nonetheless, the instinct
toward formalism manifests in a proceduralism that emphasizes clear
requirements and unbending strictures. Rule orientation thus tends toward an
understanding of fairness as following terms of decision laid down ex ante
regardless of the underlying content of the rights at issue and the context of the
relevant decision: a deadline is a deadline, regardless of why a party failed to
meet it. Standards, by contrast, can more easily attend to the substantive
reasons why someone acted or failed to act, leavening otherwise harsh
consequences in appropriate cases.
As Kathleen Sullivan has argued, there is not always a direct parallel
between law's formalism, particularly in its focus on procedural regularity, and
the failure to attend to the substantive concerns often associated with equity,
such as sensitivity to context and a functionalism that can be deployed in the
service of fair play.'55 Joseph Singer has further argued that the rules/standards
The literature on this tension is vast, and of continuing relevance in property theory.
See, e.g., David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L. REv. 139, 142-44
(2009); Singer, supra note 28, at 61. The seminal work in this discourse is Duncan
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1685, 16871713 (1976).
152 Kennedy, supra note 151, at 1691-92.
153 Bean v. Walker, 464 N.Y.S.2d 895, 897 (App. Div. 1983).
154 For one of the many classic statements summarizing this aspect of equity, see Hecht
Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944) ("The essence of equity jurisdiction has been
the power . . . to do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case.
Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it. The qualities of mercy and practicality
have made equity the instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation between the public
interest and private needs as well as between competing private claims.").
155 Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term - Foreword: The Justices of
Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REv. 22, 96 (1992) ("Few observers today, however,
would affirm any strong requisite connection between these political dichotomies and the
rules/standards choice."); id. at 96-97 ("[T]he political valences of rules and standards shift
in cycles over time.").
151
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debate ignores the reality that rules are less bounded than traditional formalist
associations suggest, as they are not self-executing and require discretion to
determine their scope and application. 156 At the same time, Singer notes,
standards are hardly the unpredictable realm of unfettered discretion that they
are so often caricatured as, given the constraints of precedent, context, and
common sense.' 57
The second-order complexity that Sullivan and Singer highlight is evident as
a general matter in property,' 58 and in mortgage law specifically, where one
can find doctrines with equitable origins that are lender-focused - most notably
the basic concept of foreclosure' 5 9 _ alongside technical, formal, procedural
requirements that are borrower-focused (for example, those that the current
jurisprudence reinforces). Indeed, much of the body of foreclosure law
provides mortgagors procedural protection of the most basic formal variety.
Notice requirements, for example, are ubiquitous in both judicial and nonjudicial foreclosure states, as are technical requirements for how the power-ofsale authority must be exercised in foreclosure.160 Courts regularly declare that
such procedural protections must be closely adhered to, largely because of the
connection between procedural regularity and the protection of the typically
more vulnerable party to the transaction.161
There is thus much to be said about avoiding reductionist associations in this
discussion,162 and, as a practical matter, the merger of law and equity obscures
the once relatively clear lines between these modes of approach.'63 That said,
156 Singer, supra note

28, at 10-17.
1" Id. at 17-21 (discussing "exemplars" as shaping standards and presumptions as adding
predictability to their implementation).
158 Indeed, Carol Rose argues that in property, there is a "softer, more sociable, and
dialogic side to crystal rules," particularly in fostering commerce and ongoing engagement
through clear entitlements. Rose, supra note 29, at 607.
15 See supra Part II.A.
16o This is reflected in statutory and regulatory approaches that likewise map procedural
or substantive norms. See infra Part III.B.2.
161Perhaps the most significant lender-side response to procedural requirements and
substantive review has been the attempt to avoid judicial oversight altogether. In reaction to
the strictures of judicial foreclosure, lenders fairly early in U.S. history began to use deeds
of trust instead of mortgages, which provided a non-judicial avenue for realizing collateral.
See Robert H. Skilton, Developments in Mortgage Law and Practice, 17 TEMP. L.Q. 315,
323-35 (1943). As deeds of trust became more common, lenders in states that allowed them
began adding "power-of-sale" clauses to mortgages, which had the same effect. Nonjudicial foreclosure is regulated by statute in those states that allow it, but the requirements
are simpler than for judicial foreclosure and necessitate borrowers filing an affirmative
action in order to contest the sale of the mortgaged property. See supra notes 64, 84.
162 Cf TAMANAHA, supra note 13, at 160-62.
161 Cf Henry E. Smith, Response, Does Equity Pass the
Laugh Test?: A Response to

Oliarand Sprigman, 95 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 9, 16 (2009), http://www.virginialawreview.or
g/inbrief/2009/04/20/Smith.pdf ("There has always been a suspicion of equity and the need
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there are still strong reasons why the tools that equity deploys remain
important in the mortgage context. Equitable "muddy" reasoning importantly
attends to substance and not just form. This is particularly critical in a
transactional environment

-

single-family

home finance

-

in which

sophisticated repeat players on the lender side control the form of the
transaction, often to the detriment of substantive fairness. Similarly, equitable
considerations reflect the necessity of attending to power dynamics, again
1
critical in an arena in which power imbalances are endemic. '
In a broader sense, what this suggests is that considerations of distributive
justice can be implicated by the quality and texture of the process by which
relief is granted in an area of law. That proposition can at times be submerged
in the rules/standards debate, but is particularly resonant in the context of
mortgage law, where the accretion of centuries underscores the link between
distress and
the predominating mode of judicial reasoning in working through 65
technical
below,1
the quality of the ensuing resolution. For reasons discussed
but the
interrelated,
formality and substantive outcomes can be strategically
distress
mortgage
of
relative balance between contextual, post hoc resolution
regularity
and more atonal formalism that focuses primarily on procedural
matters nonetheless.
2. Informality and Liquidity: Securitization as Antiformalism
On the other side of the mortgagor-mortgagee relationship, the emerging
new formalism is revealing the breadth of informality that dominated mortgage
securitization. In many ways, the expansion of the residential mortgage-backed
securities market in the housing boom was predicated on introducing
somewhat artificial flexibility into a procedural arena traditionally marked by
formality. The legal superstructure of securitization and the mortgage market
to keep it cabined (for example, only acting in personam, and only when the legal remedy is
inadequate and not in derogation of property rights) but after the fusion of law and equity,
our view of formalism versus context-based discretion has become polarized.").
16 To the proposition that lenders control the form of mortgage transactions because
mortgage documents are generally not open to negotiation, some counter that rational
borrowers will choose lenders that have more favorable terms and reputations. Cf Lucian A.
Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets, 104
MIcH. L. REv. 827, 828 (2006). It has long been recognized, however, that, for a variety of
psychological, cognitive, and informational reasons, borrowers do not do very well
shopping for the basic economic terms of home loans. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Need for Mortgage Rules Consonant with the
Economic and PsychologicalDynamics of the Home Sale and Loan Transaction,70 VA. L.
REv. 1083, 1110-35 (1984); see also Frank Lopez, Note, Using the Fair Housing Act to
Combat PredatoryLending, 6 GEo. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 73, 75-80 (1999) (discussing
behavioral disparities in information processing around mortgage options). If that is the
case, it is hardly plausible that most home borrowers have the ability to shop for acceptable
legal terms.
16s See infra Part III.A.3.
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as it developed over the past two decades thus stands in tension with the legacy
apparatus of realizing collateral in the primary mortgage market.1 66
It is possible to speculate about the reasons why creditor-side interests in the
mortgage context have tended to be more comfortable in the arena of law and
formalism traditionally, and why that association has been loosened in the era
of securitization. Lenders approach many decisions from a risk-management
perspective, for example, in shifting from individualized credit evaluation to
quantification and automation. 167 It may be that as lending technology has
developed, and the information costs associated with so many aspects of
origination and servicing have fallen, it has become commonplace to abstract
out the granular texture of the individual lender-borrower relationship.
The structure of securitization itself, however, seems to require a certain
basic level of flexibility, at least as compared to the norms that prevail in
traditional, state-level real property practice.' 68 This is inherent in the active
trading - which treated mortgage loans technically and literally as
indistinguishable from negotiable instruments that make up the staple of
commercial paper - facilitated by MERS and by the flouting of state
recordation regimes in assignments. Liquidity, as Hernando de Soto has
famously argued, requires fungible assets, the essential attributes of which can
be communicated across disparate markets. 169 The secondary mortgage market
has pushed mortgage lenders in the primary market in this direction for
decades.17 0 It seems evident, however, that in the housing boom, the move to
fungibility shifted to an embrace of informality to the point that when statelevel requirements associated with secondary market trades posed a barrier, the
industry either attempted to structure around those requirements, as with
David Dana has outlined the basic cost-benefit analysis for formality
in both initial
securitization and the resolution of subsequent mortgage distress. Dana, supra note 17, at
508-09 & n.13. As a number of commentators have observed, collective action problems
and fragmentation through securitization undermine the incentives that any individual actor
on the lender side might have to internalize these costs. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz,
Marginalizing Risk, 89 WASH. U. L. REv. 487, 501-03 (2012); Note, The Perils of
Fragmentationand Reckless Innovation, 125 HARv. L. REV. 1799, 1813-14 (2012).
167 Of course, not all lenders - or intermediaries
or investors - are sophisticated
commercial entities. There are small and individual lenders in the home-mortgage context,
including community banks, seller financing, and interfamily loans. But the securitization
cases generally involve relatively large institutional actors on the lending side.
168 One can quibble with cause and effect here, that
is, it is not entirely clear that liquidity
in the secondary market during the boom required the informality that MERS and lax
assignment and recordation practices provided, or whether at least the latter of those factors
was primarily a result of the overheated environment of the boom.
166

169 HERNANDO DE SoTo, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL:
WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE

WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 56-58 (2000).

170See Michael H. Schill, Unformity or Diversity: ResidentialReal Estate FinanceLaw
in the 1990s and the Implications of ChangingFinancialMarkets, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1261,
1267-71 (1991).
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MERS, or simply ignored them.17 1 Given the history of lender formalism, this
is ironic indeed.
III. NEW FORMALISM CONSIDERED
It should be clear at this point that, descriptively, the new formalism runs
counter to a tradition in mortgage law of providing substantive protection to
borrowers in the face of the potentially harsh consequences of technical
requirements that often work to the advantage of lender-side interests. This
inversion can be explained in a number of ways, including a simple regression
to the mean after an era of procedural laxity in the housing boom, a
reinvigoration of vital procedural - as opposed to substantive - protection for
home borrowers, or perhaps even much-needed leverage in an era of crisis that
largely lacks structural reform. This Part begins by exploring each of these
theories in turn.
However the turn in the jurisprudence is best understood, it is also important
to attend to its potential consequences, both for the effects this period will have
on the system of mortgage distress and for broader efforts at reform. This Part
accordingly sounds some notes of caution about the emerging caselaw,
however necessary it has been in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, and
explores insights that the formalism and flexibility divide provides as efforts to
remediate the fallout of the crisis in home finance system continue. Finally,
this Part reflects on what the new formalism might mean for property law more
generally at a time when theoretical debates about conceptualism and pluralism
are again at the forefront of property scholarship.
Explainingthe FormalistTurn
A number of explanations are emerging for the formalist turn. As this
Section makes clear, all have their limitations, and they are not necessarily
mutually exclusive.
A.

1. Is Everything Old New Again?
An initial, perhaps most intuitive, way to understand the judicial reaction as
securitization has crashed into traditional primary mortgage distress law is that
the apparent resulting formalism is nothing new. It might be possible, then, to
explain the turn in the jurisprudence simply as an overdue corrective to lax
practices that were abused, innocently or maliciously, during the heyday of the
residential mortgage-backed securities boom. According to this view, issues of
standing, real party in interest, assignment chains, and the like have always
been fundamental, and the apparent reassertion of their importance is merely a
It also bears noting that risk was intermediated in ways that may have exacerbated the
tendency toward informality. When one party originates, another securitizes, and yet another
holds the security, the incentive for observing required formalities at any given stage in the
securitization process is undermined. Cf Komgold, supra note 24, at 729-30 (discussing
risk allocation in the securitization process).
171
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regression to the procedural mean. 17 2 Courts, confronted with a significant
increase in the opportunity to examine the intersection between the primary
and secondary mortgage markets, and with energized advocates pressing
claims involving technical irregularity, have had little choice but to validate
those assertions that have merit. 173
This understanding has some appeal. After all, it is certainly true that most
of the doctrinal underpinnings of the new formalism were staples, albeit fairly
obscure ones, of mortgage distress litigation long before the present crisis. To
dismiss the turn in the caselaw in this way, however, ignores the genuine
novelty of the dynamics that securitization has generated for the traditional
practice of foreclosure and mortgage-related bankruptcies.174 The ubiquity of
securitization has wrought a genuine transformation in terms of fragmentation,
informality, and a disconnection between individual borrowers and the lending
structures that now dominate the industry. The emerging formalism is thus
better recognized as reflecting this new structure. 175 The regression-to-thetechnical-mean explanation thus does not seem to capture what is clearly a new
phenomenon, even if the rules that are newly salient are longstanding. It also
overly discounts the outrage that courts have expressed about the corners
lender-side interests have cut, 17 6 and litigants' repeated recognition that the
playing field has changed.' 77

This perspective, moreover, emphasizes judicial prerogatives over the instrumental
consequences of courts' newfound aggressiveness on procedural regularity in mortgage
distress.
173 This view reflects a variation of the efficiency-of-the-common-law argument
positing
that borrowers are likely to be defending with all viable claims and courts are simply
responding to the most meritorious. Cf Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in
the Common Law: A Supply-Side Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1551, 1552-53 (2003)
(arguing that the development of the early common law led to the production of efficient
rules). In this light, new formalism can be seen as the residue of a legal punctuated
equilibrium, providing new prominence to judicial minima in the mortgage distress context,
but nothing other than that new salience. Cf Davidson & Dyal-Chand, supra note 26, at
1609-10 (discussing evolutionary metaphors for understanding law's response to crisis).
174 See supra note 7.
17s For an argument that a longstanding antifragmentation principle in property law
provides a basis - and constitutional legitimacy - for mortgage modifications, see David A.
Dana, The ForeclosureCrisis and the Antifragmentation Principle in State PropertyLaw,
77 U. CHI. L. REv. 97, 106-17 (2010).
176 Indeed, an important subtext here is the institutional prerogatives of
the judiciary in
the crisis. Judge Boyko and other judges have been open about the fact that their outrage is
directed less toward the unfairness posed to borrowers subject to improper foreclosures, and
more toward the perceived flouting by lenders, trustees, and servicers of the courts'
authority. See supra note 72.
177 See, e.g., RAO ET AL., supra note
7, at 113.
172
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2. Vital and Direct Consumer Protection
A second, and increasingly predominating, explanation acknowledges the
novelty of the new formalism and highlights the role that courts are playing in
17
protecting borrowers through the revival of procedural regularity. 8 This view
focuses on the intersection between formalism in mortgage distress litigation
and the recognition that the underlying asset, the borrower's home, is both
fraught with symbolic meaning and genuinely represents a locus179for financial
and social capital, individual identity, and community belonging.
From a broad consumer-protection perspective, then, the requirements
newly revived in the aftermath of the housing crisis can be understood as
providing fundamental procedural protections against fraud and mistake. If a
lender-side party is asserting the right to involuntarily transfer property, the
borrower at a minimum must have confidence that she is facing the actual
holder of her debt and the lien attached to the debt, that the party seeking to
foreclose or make a claim in bankruptcy genuinely has the right to do so at the
time of filing, and that no other claimants might be able to make claims on the
180
property if the default at issue is resolved. Moreover, these procedural and
technical requirements are also meant to mitigate risk to third parties in
181
foreclosure, as the post-Ibanez cases illustrate. Ensuring proper foreclosure
182
requirements thus protects not only parties purchasing through foreclosure,
183
but also title companies and others who rely on procedural regularity.
178See Dana, supra note 17, at 507-08; Pitegoff & Underkuffler, supra note 16, at 133-

34. According to this view, the institutional prerogatives of the courts are less important
than the deployment of those prerogatives in the service of protecting borrowers.
179 Cf Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Home as Ownership, Dispossession as Foreclosure: The
Impact of the Current Crisis on the American Model of "Home," in THE IDEA OF HOME IN
LAW: DISPLACEMENT AND DISPOSSESSION 41 (Lorna Fox O'Mahony & James A. Sweeney

eds., 2011) (arguing that the concept of home exists in the law, but the law fails to recognize
the importance of the home in the human experience); Lorna Fox O'Mahony & James A.
Sweeney, The Idea of Home in Law: Displacement and Dispossession, in THE IDEA OF
HOME IN LAW: DISPLACEMENT AND DISPOSSESSION, supra, at 1, 1-11 (analyzing the

government's response to the foreclosure crisis on the American conception of home). But
see Stephanie M. Stern, ResidentialProtectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home, 107
MICH. L. REv. 1093, 1097-98 (2009) (arguing that, from the perspective of the empirical
evidence available on the long-term psychological harm associated with dispossession, the
law overprotects homeownership, including in foreclosure).
'10 See Dana, supra note 17, at 516 (arguing that absent the formal requirements of
foreclosure, "one does not truly know whether the property owners owed what the servicers
claim they did").
181See, e.g., Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 955 N.E.2d 884, 892-93 (Mass. 2011) (applying
Ibanez to hold that a bona fide purchaser cannot receive title through a void foreclosure
sale).
182 There is always a risk that if the wrong party has foreclosed or there are other
procedural irregularities, the foreclosure could be collaterally attacked.
183 Tying procedural regularity in foreclosure to the structure of the secondary market,
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There is much to this view of new formalism, and any advocate would be
entirely remiss in failing to press any available claim.184 Understanding the
emerging caselaw purely in terms of the short-term benefits it provides for
individual borrowers in distress, however, may obscure larger dynamics about
the appropriate balance of procedural regularity and substantive review in
responding to the legacy of the housing crisis. These concerns are spelled out
in detail below.185 At this juncture it is sufficient to note that the balance of
formalism evident in the caselaw may have longer-term consequences.' 86
3. Procedural Leverage for Substantive Reform
A variation on the view of procedural formality as consumer protection is
the understanding that regardless of the direct effects of formalization, courts'
receptivity to the evident failure of the securitization process to conform to
technical requirements has provided leverage for borrowers in distress with
few other tools available. Indeed, for individual borrowers, it seems clear that
advocates have sought to use questions such as standing, chain of assignment
requirements, holder doctrines, and the like to gain leverage for substantive

David Dana also argues that by making foreclosure more costly, strict adherence to
mortgage formalities will tend to realign incentives in the securitization process. Dana,
supra note 17, at 508.
184 Indeed, it would raise challenging ethical concerns if mortgagor advocates did not
advance available formal defenses. There is an extensive literature on potential conflicts
between the interests of individual clients and arguably larger public interest concerns that
might animate advocacy. See, e.g., Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and
the Reproduction of Professional Authority: An Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERING:
POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 3-25 (Austin Sarat & Stuart
Scheingold eds., 1998). It is beyond the scope of this Article to fully attend to how this
conflict might be resolved for advocates concerned about the long-term structure of the
mortgage-distress system from a consumer-protection perspective if there were reasonable
choices about advocacy strategies available, but the potential for such concern is manifest.
1" See infra Part III.B. 1.
186 This discussion obviously sets to one side the lender-side
critique of new formalism
as a panoply of meaningless technicalities that only slow down the necessary process of
clearing distressed properties. See supra note 15. This critique, moreover, dovetails with one
standard response to post hoc equitable claims by borrowers that highlights the risk of
borrower opportunism. Cf Christopher Mayer et al., Mortgage Modification and Strategic
Behavior: Evidence from a Legal Settlement with Countrywide 34 (Columbia Law & Econ.
Working Paper No. 404, 2012), availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=1836451. There is evidence, however, that borrowers who owe more on their homes
than the homes are worth are generally not defaulting at the rate that would be suggested if
homeowners were evaluating the investment value of the collateral. Brent T. White,
Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear, and the Social Management of the
Housing Crisis, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 971, 983-85 (2010) (proposing that Americans
walk away from their substantially underwater mortgages because in strategically defaulting
"[m]illions of U.S. homeowners could save hundreds of thousands of dollars").
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relief.'87 For such borrowers, this may reflect the fact that they have had little
choice - assuming that they even have the resources to challenge a foreclosure
(and such challenge is warranted) - other than to pursue what procedural
claims can be raised.' 88
Beyond individual claims, it is also possible to understand the formalist turn
as a means, or at least an opportunity, to force more systemic change.
Litigation unearths lender, servicer, and intermediary technical practices, and
allows regulators and other governmental actors to address fundamental
questions.189 Perhaps the most notable example of this leverage from
procedural claims can be found in the National Mortgage Settlement. On
February 9, 2012, HUD, the Justice Department, and forty-nine state attorneys
general announced a settlement with the nation's five leading servicers - Ally,
Bank of America, Citi, JPMorgan Chase, and Wells Fargo - stemming from
investigations into robosigning allegations that began in the fall of 2010.190
The settlement was structured to provide up to $17 billion in loan
modifications for underwater borrowers, including principal reduction, up to
$3 billion in refinancing assistance, and funds both to compensate homeowners
who lost their homes in improper foreclosures and to states to fund mortgageSee Corder, Unlikely Allies, supra note 65, at 24 ("[O]ne positive aspect of the
standing defense in the eyes of homeowners is that by making it more costly for trustees to
instigate foreclosure proceedings and slowing down foreclosures, mortgagors will have
more leverage to renegotiate the terms of the underlying loan."); Morgenson, supra note 67
(quoting consumer advocate April Charney, in reaction to Judge Boyko's In re Foreclosure
decision, as stating that "[h]opefully this will convince everybody that the time to work out
these home loans is now").
188 In addition to serving as a tool for leverage over the substantive resolution of
mortgage distress, the technical precision evident in the new formalism can also be used to
gain information that might otherwise remain opaque. One of the repeated challenges in
mortgage distress litigation, from the borrower perspective, is the difficulty in tracing
mortgage and servicing information, particularly with respect to MERS. See Dana, supra
note 17, at 513, 519; Robinson, supra note 101, at 1638. There are thus not only immediate
informational benefits from requirements to trace assignments and the like, but also
discovery opportunities in pressing the failure to follow such requirements.
'" A few judicial flares have exposed more widespread problems in servicing, including
foreclosure-related practices. In one recent, although long-pending, bankruptcy case in the
Eastern District of Louisiana, In re Jones, No. 03-16518, 2012 WL 1155715, at *3 (Bankr.
E.D. La. Apr. 5, 2012), the judge reviewed a number of errors by Wells Fargo with respect
to the application of payments by the debtor, including improper post-petition charges,
which resulted in a net overcharge of nearly $25,000. In a scathing opinion that called Wells
Fargo to task for diverting payments as "part of its normal course of conduct," the court
found Wells Fargo's actions to be "egregious," in "reckless disregard for the stay it
violated," "clandestine," and "disturbing." Id. at *5, *7-8. As a result of the widespread
servicing failures that Wells Fargo had admitted to and not corrected, the court awarded
punitive damages in the amount of $3,171,154. Id. at *10.
190See Fact Sheet: Mortgage Servicing Settlement, supra note 115. For background on
the underlying robosigning problems, see Hosking Memorandum, supra note 106, at 1.
187
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related consumer-protection efforts.' 91 In addition to this mortgage relief, the
settlement included mandatory servicing standards, such as enhanced preforeclosure notification, reforms to filing procedures, loss-mitigation
protections, and restrictions on certain servicing fees.192
In a prime example of what Steven Davidoff and David Zaring recently
described as "regulation by deal" endemic to the response to the economic
crisis, 93 the attorneys general and federal negotiators involved in the National
Mortgage Settlement were able to obtain significant loan modifications at a
scale that other efforts - such as the successive iterations of various federal
home-mortgage-modification programs 94 - have largely failed to generate.' 95
Although the scale of these modifications is dwarfed by the magnitude of the
underwater mortgage debt that remains unaddressed,196 the settlement does
"I Philip A. Lehman, Executive Summary of Multistate/Federal Settlement of
ForeclosureMisconduct Claims, NAT'L MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT 2-4, https://d9klfgibkcquc.
cloudfront.net/NMSExecutiveSummary-7-23-2012.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2013).
192 Id. at 3.
13 Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation By Deal:
The Government's
Response to the FinancialCrisis,61 ADMIN. L. REv. 463, 535 (2009).
194 The federal government has promulgated a series of voluntary initiatives in response
to structural problems in home finance. The first was a Bush Administration program called
the HOPE NOW Alliance, designed to promote counseling and loan workout negotiations.
See Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Homeownership - Dream or Disaster?, 21 J. AFFORDABLE
HousING & COMMUNITY DEv. L. 17, 40-43 (2012) (detailing these voluntary initiatives and
related programs). In 2008 the Federal Housing Administration began the HOPE for
Homeowners program, implementing a part of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of
2008 that primarily focused on refinancing federally insured loans. Id. at 43-44 (citing
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654
(codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.)). The third wave of federal response was the
Obama Administration's Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan, the centerpiece of
which has been a Treasury Department voluntary program for loan modifications. Id. at 4550. Although reports of the success of these programs vary, it is generally acknowledged
that they have not made significant inroads into structurally rebalancing outstanding
mortgage debt at the requisite scale.
195 Lenders do not often renegotiate seriously delinquent loans; indeed, one study
indicated that servicers have undertaken loan modifications that reduce borrower payments
in only roughly three percent of seriously delinquent mortgages since the crisis emerged.
Manuel Adelino, Kristopher Gerardi & Paul S. Willen, Why Don 't Lenders Renegotiate
More Home Mortgages?Redefaults, Self-Cures, and Securitization 3 (Fed. Reserve Bank of
Bos., Public Policy Discussion Paper No. 09-4, 2009), availableat http://www.bos.frb.org/e
conomic/ppdp/2009/ppdpO9O4.pdf. A number of theories have been offered as to why
lenders rarely renegotiate, including the constraints of the pooling and servicing agreements
that govern securitized trusts, as well as borrower behavior in terms of re-defaults and
borrowers curing delinquencies in the absence of modification. See id. at 4-7.
196 Bishop & Assocs., L.L.C., National Mortgage Settlement May Not Help Struggling
Homeowners, FINDLAW (Apr. 12, 2012), http://knowledgebase.findlaw.com/kb/2012/Apr/56
2875.html ("The settlement only addresses about 2.4% of the negative equity in the U.S.
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underscore the potential for advocates to use technical failings to move a
recalcitrant industry in a substantive direction. 197
Understanding the leverage that the turn in the jurisprudence has facilitated
is important, but, as with the general consumer-protection explanation, this
view risks obscuring the larger consequences of individual and collective
advocacy choices.
B.

Concerns and Consequences

However one understands the dynamics driving the new formalism,
situating the emerging jurisprudence in the context of the longstanding tension
in mortgage history between law and equity gives some reasons for caution, at
least with respect to the consumer-protection perspective. At heart, the
emerging doctrine valorizes procedural regularity over substantive fairness,
and this may leave a more brittle mortgage distress system for borrowers in the
long run. The formalist turn also represents a mismatch between the depth of
the challenges facing borrowers who took out home loans during the boom - a
significant percentage of outstanding mortgage debt, given annual origination
levels since the crisis' 98 - and the remedies available, which may distract from
more fundamental reform.
To be clear, the argument is not that following the requirements for proper
assignment, proof of standing, and other basic formalities is not important. It
manifestly is, given the importance of people's homes and the myriad of thirdparty interests implicated in responding to mortgage default. Rather, the
argument is that it is important to pay attention to the potential unintended
consequences of a system newly re-accustomed to, and focused on, indicia of
lender procedural regularity.199
housing market.").
197 In a similar example of procedural shortcomings leading to substantive outcomes,
fourteen mortgage servicers entered into consent orders with the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Reserve, and the Office of Thrift Supervision in April
2011, whereby the servicers agreed to review foreclosure actions over the prior two years
and, if errors, misrepresentations, or other deficiencies led to financial injury, offer
remediation to borrowers. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, U.S. DEP'T OF
TREASURY, INTERIM STATUS REPORT: FORECLOSURE-RELATED CONSENT ORDERS 3-4 (2012),
2
In

available at http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/ 012/2012-95a.pdf.
January 2013 a number of these servicers reached an agreement with the OCC and the
Federal Reserve to lift the terms of the foreclosure review in exchange for more than $9
billion in payments and other assistance. See Correcting Foreclosure Practices, OFFICE
COMPTROLLER

CURRENCY,

http://www.occ.gov/topics/consumer-protection/foreclosure-

prevention/correcting-foreclosure-practices.html (last updated Jan. 24, 2013).
198 See U.S.

DEP'T. OF

HOUS.

AND

URBAN

DEV.,

FHA-INSURED

MORTGAGE ORIGINATIONS AND MARKET SHARE REPORT 2011 -

Q3, at 2

SINGLE-FAMILY

(2011), available at

portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=fhamktq3_l1 .pdf (detailing origination
levels).
199 It is certainly possible to argue that the right procedural safeguards can produce
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1. The Legacy of New Formalism
a. Brittleness
To begin, there is a risk that the success of the formalist turn may leave a
mortgage-distress system that is more attuned to procedural regularity than to
substantive norms. It is certainly true that formalism need not be equivalent on
both sides of a conflict; in other words, the legal system is perfectly capable of
allocating the risk of procedural failure on the party best equipped to handle
that risk. 200 Thus, the legacy of the emerging jurisprudence may be an
asymmetrical formalism that holds lender-side interests - in the main the
parties that are the more sophisticated and better able to respond to heightened
formality - to a different, and more stringent, standard. Framed in this way, a
new system that holds lenders to high standards of technical precision would
not adversely affect borrowers, who would still be able to invoke equity where
the circumstances demanded.
Advocacy choices regarding which issues to elevate and how to frame
claims, however, influence the tenor of any given area of law.20 1 Law is not
endogenous; it grows in response to the pressures exerted upon it and, as
Justice Holmes argued, is shaped less by any inherent logic and more by the
accretion of experience. 202 The borrower push to emphasize formalism in
mortgage practice, however understandable, may thus give primacy to the set
of judicial tools least amenable to claims of individual substantive justice.
Indeed, there seems to be little indication, thus far, that courts are drawing
fine-grained distinctions in procedural formality based on equitable
considerations of context and relative vulnerability.
Moreover, in the long run, lenders, servicers, intermediaries, and investors
have much greater capacity to respond to an environment of mortgage law that
valorizes technical regularity. This is because of the control this side of the
mortgagor-mortgagee relationship has over the initial terms of mortgage loans
due to the repeat nature of their relationship with the mortgage-distress system,
and because of the greater resources they tend to have in the aggregate. This
creates the risk - and only time will tell whether it materializes, but it is worth
equitable outcomes. However, this raises an empirical question that is difficult to answer namely, how the cases represented by the new formalism are being resolved after dismissal.
If the jurisprudence is generally leading to settlements that are favorable to borrowers, the
relationship between procedure and substance becomes more complicated; but if lenders are
adjusting and re-filing cases, then the immediate consequences of the caselaw are muted.
The notes of caution this Article sounds acknowledge the clear potential short-term benefits
of the new formalism, but seek to place those benefits in the context of a longer-term
perspective.
200Cf Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis ofMortgagorProtection Laws, 77 VA.
L. REv. 489, 499 (1991).
201 See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY 3 (1992).
202 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1

(Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,

Little, Brown & Co. 1963) (1881).
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attending to at this early juncture - that the mortgage-distress system left in the
aftermath of the housing crisis becomes more attuned to the sharp edges and
clear determinism that repeat players with deeper resources are more likely to
find conducive. 203
b. Mismatch
The new formalism also raises a fundamental problem of mismatch, in that
the emerging caselaw does not really address the underlying structural or
2
substantive concerns that gave rise to the crisis in the first place. 04 Most of the
relevant cases result in a dismissal without prejudice, which allows servicers or
securitization trustees to correct the paper trail and re-file the foreclosure or
claim in bankruptcy. 205 It is true that this may be the only leverage available
for most homeowners, but that fact only underscores the disconnect between
that leverage and questions of lending structure, fairness of origination
practices, and the terms of resulting loans, all of which are claims akin to
traditional equitable defenses. 206
203Cf Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 95, 103 (1974).
204 The potential for mismatch between proceduralist approaches and the underlying
substantive concerns at issue in any given area of jurisprudence is hardly unique to
mortgage distress. Plea bargaining, for example, is an area where the commitments of the
criminal adversarial system seem quite divorced from the actual practice of daily criminal
procedure, and similar disjunctions occur in many other areas. See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura,
The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive
ConstitutionalRights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1627 (1992) (discussing the evolution of
procedural constitutional protection for immigrants in the face of a plenary power doctrine
that denies substantive constitutional protection).
205 See, e.g., In re Foreclosure Cases, Nos. 1:07CV2282, 07CV2532, 07CV2560,
07CV2602, 07CV2631, 07CV2638, 07CV2681, 07CV2695, 07CV2920, 07CV2930,
07CV2949, 07CV2950, 07CV3000, 07CV3029, 2007 WL 3232430, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Oct.
31, 2007); In re Hayes, 393 BR. 259, 270 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2008); CitiMortgage, Inc. v.
Nunez, No. 2558/09, slip op. at 1-2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 13, 2010) (explaining that the case
was dismissed without prejudice so that the bank would have a chance to submit the
required affidavit and proceed with foreclosure, because simply "granting a 'timeout' to
plaintiff... is a waste ofjudicial resources").
206 One case that provides an example of a court substantively grappling with the
predicate conditions under which mortgage debt was issued is Commonwealth v. Fremont
Investment & Loan, 897 N.E.2d 548, 556 (Mass. 2008). Fremont was brought by the
Massachusetts Attorney General against Fremont Investment & Loan and its parent
company for acting unfairly and deceptively in originating subprime loans from 2004
through 2007. Id. at 550-51. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the grant of a preliminary
injunction against the lender, given that the loans at issue had short introductory teaser rates
that were at least three percent below the index rate - a rate that would have exceeded a
50% debt-to-income ratio for the borrowers - and had a 100% loan-to-value ratio or certain
prepayment penalties. Id. at 554. Moreover, a handful of New York cases have addressed
the behavior of subprime lenders acting in bad faith in the foreclosure and loss-mitigation
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In terms of the mismatch between the procedural turn and the structure of
the market, there is also an argument that formalization overly impedes a
system that should be better at clearing title and returning to the market
property that will not be rehabilitated for an individual borrower. 20 7 This
function has an important consumer-protection element, in that the value of the
home of any individual borrower is in no small measure dependent on the
value of surrounding homes and the local market, 208 both of which are heavily
impacted by homes in delinquency but pending foreclosure, as well as the
overhang of already-foreclosed-upon but not-yet-sold inventory. 209 David
Dana has argued that the cost of ex post formalism will tend to incentivize
appropriate ex ante behavior by those involved in the process of
securitization,2 10 but that it is unlikely to focus those incentives on the terms of
loans, the ability of borrowers to pay, or other substantive elements of the
initial transaction. 2 11
Moreover, one overarching problem with the recent jurisprudence is that,
with some notable exceptions, the procedural protections they augur do not
readily get at the bulk of how distressed mortgages are resolved. 212 As with the
reality that plea deals vastly overshadow criminal trials, it is likewise true that
most foreclosures are not the subject of judicial oversight of any sort. 2 13 This is
true in non-judicial foreclosures to the extent that they generally require

process. See Moringiello,supra note 22, at 1619 n.133.
207 These are cases, for all of the formal failings of securitization, in which the
underlying debt and default are not often seriously at issue. This fact tends to obscure the
question of whether an individual borrower should have been marketed a given loan in the
first place. Answering that question requires attention to such issues as the fairness of the
originating process, unconscionability, equal-credit concerns, and other limits on predatory
practices.
208

See

LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME: PROPERTY VALUES BEYOND
PROPERTY LINEs 2 (2009).

See Mallach, supra note 25, at 13.
Dana, supra note 17, at 508, 512.
211 It is true that more individualized, contextual review is hardly likely
to speed up the
process of foreclosure, but many instances of foreclosure could be amenable to alternative
means of loss mitigation that might more rationally help housing markets recover.
Moreover, it is important to acknowledge that structural reform is not likely to emerge from
individual cases resolved through law or equity; that will take legislation and regulation.
The only point here is that the structure of ex ante incentives that focus on the procedure of
securitization seem more misaligned with those substantive reforms than relief that focuses
on issues of fairness in the transactions involved.
212 For an excellent overview of variables that influence whether borrowers after default
end up in foreclosure or are offered loan modifications or other avenues of relief, see Sewin
Chan et al., PathwaysAfter Default: What Happens to Distressed MortgageBorrowers and
Their Homes? (NYU Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 11-33,
2011), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract-1928212.
213 See supra note 83.
209
210
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affirmative litigation on the part of the borrower, but also more generally
214
across the board because most foreclosures are simply not contested.
Arguably, this could mean that most borrowers simply have no defense, but the
more likely reality is that for a not insignificant number of mortgagors in
default, attention to the terms and conditions under which they took on debt in
the first place might give an opening to restructuring or other substantive
relief.215
One should not overly valorize the benefits, or minimize the costs, of a shift
toward more equitable approaches to resolving mortgage distress, and
concomitant regulatory approaches that are contextual and attend to
substantive fairness. There is no panacea here. The more fundamental point,
however, is that the current landscape of mortgage distress is too heavily
skewed toward formalism. A balance that better reflects the traditional role that
216
equity has played for borrowers is warranted.
c.

Distraction

One final concern with the emerging post-crisis jurisprudence is the risk that
a focus - by advocates, courts, and policymakers - on procedural regularity
217
might undermine efforts to advance substantive and structural reform. Given
the depth of the housing crisis, it is notable - although perhaps hardly
surprising, given the contemporary political economy of the housing market how relatively few significant doctrinal and regulatory changes have emerged
214 Moreover, there is a growing problem of "shadow" foreclosures, a phenomenon in
which no formal proceeding is initiated, but mortgagees bring pressure on mortgagors to
reach settlement in order to avoid litigation altogether. See Dana,supra note 17, at 521. This
is perhaps another unintended consequence of increasing formalism.
215 It is also possible that the experience of a mortgage distress system dominated by
daunting formalism deters borrowers from challenging foreclosures in the first place. As
noted, more than ninety percent of foreclosures are uncontested. Schmit, supra note 83. The
experience that many borrowers have of an unequal playing field with lenders plausibly
translates into a reluctance to venture into the technical aspects of foreclosure defense. This
reluctance no doubt partially stems from the expense of such a challenge, but may also stem
from the sense that technical regularity will tend to work in favor of repeat players who can
master such requirements.
216 Equitable responses are not appropriate in all cases, perhaps not even in run-of-themill cases. But the present landscape of mortgage distress seems largely occupied by
challenges that attend to technical requirements. This leaves very little traction for inquiries
that focus on the underlying substance of the actual initial mortgage transaction, rare cases
like Fremont being notable exceptions. See supra note 206. Even a modest rebalancing for
those borrowers who have plausible claims related to the terms of origination - or even the
feasibility of loan modification - would be warranted.
217 This is not to argue that technical defenses now taking such prominence are playing
no role whatsoever in responding to dysfunction in the kinds of practices the cases have
brought to light. Rather, there are more fundamental, structural concerns about the lingering
aftermath of the housing crisis that are not receiving as much focus.
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in response, at least compared to earlier economic crises. Policymaking during
the Great Depression, for example, spawned the then-innovative long-term
fixed-rate mortgage, 218 and substantive legislative and judicial responses to the
immediate crisis included significant moratoria that gave rise to the Supreme
Court's famous Blaisdell decision. 219
Very little structural reform of that magnitude has emerged in the years
since the crisis leading to the Great Recession began. Indeed, perhaps the most
important ground for substantive reform that has notably failed involves efforts
to facilitate or mandate mortgage modifications. As observed, the Bankruptcy
Code currently gives favored treatment to residential mortgage lenders, since
home mortgagors cannot discharge their debt through bankruptcy, in contrast
to debtors who are able to modify debt in other contexts. 220 Advocates have
pressed for bringing home-mortgage debt into line with the rest of the
Bankruptcy Code, and there was a flurry of activity early in the crisis in this
direction, but such efforts have largely petered out.2 2 1
The paucity of substantive responses to the crisis should not be overstated.
Courts and legislatures have made some effort to address the fallout of the
housing crisis from a substantive and structural perspective. 222 Some states and the federal government is now turning to this issue with the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau's implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act 2 23 - have
pursued new ex ante consumer-protection measures for home borrowers. 224
Some states have also modified their foreclosure process to respond to the
sheer volume of mortgage-distress-related litigation, including by providing for
mandatory mediation and servicing reforms that require a single point of

See Green & Wachter, supra note 31, at 94-95.
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 444-47
(1934) (upholding a
state suspension of mortgagee remedies).
220 In contrast to its treatment of home mortgages,
the Bankruptcy Code allows for
modification of secured interests in most real estate, such as investment properties and
multi-family residences, as well as personal property. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2006); see
also supra note 41.
221 See supranote
22.
222 One example - although perhaps notable
for standing relatively alone in the emerging
post-crisis jurisprudence - was the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's opinion in
Fremont.See supra note 206.
223 See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note
37, at 2 (studying the potential
impact of reforms such as standards for the payment of loan principal, mortgage term
length, lump-sum payments, and evaluation of borrower resources and debt burden).
224 See Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 23,
at 682 (examining the future role of the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau); Frank A. Hirsch, Jr., The Evolution ofa Suitability
Standard in the Mortgage Lending Industry: The Subprime Meltdown Fuels the Fires of
218
219

Change, 12 N.C. BANKING INST. 21 (2008); John Pottow, Ability to Pay, 8 BERKELEY Bus.

L.J. 175, 176 (2011) (discussing lenders' "new duty to assess a consumer's ability to repay
mortgage loans").
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225
contact with a servicer and mandatory responses to attempts to renegotiate.
But much more energy and attention have been devoted to issues such as
robosigning that, while reflective of abuses in lending, obscure deeper
substantive questions and leave the use of the leverage evident in both
individual cases and broader efforts, such as the National Mortgage Settlement,
vulnerable to critique. 226
For this concern to be worth attending to, it must at least be plausible that
legal and popular focus on procedural regularity can detract from political will
to undertake more direct reform of the mortgage market. At this point, the lack
of any meaningful regulation of the home finance market and the concurrent
prominence garnered by procedural concerns are certainly suggestive, although
not proof, of a direct causal link. Furthermore, the concern here is a systemic
one. Although this is not a zero-sum game, and it would certainly be possible
to advance a borrower-focused advocacy strategy on multiple fronts, attention
is finite and victories in the procedural arena may give a false sense that more
fundamental progress is actually being made.

2. A Frame for Evaluating Housing-Finance Reform
This discussion suggests that situating new formalism in the context of the
historical tension between law and equity, as well as the debate over rules and
standards, provides a frame, borrowed from that judicial legacy, to evaluate
227
legislative and regulatory reforms emerging in the home-finance sector.
There are a number of ways to characterize these responses, but for present
purposes, two variables are particularly relevant. The first is a rough
dichotomy between policies that respond to the detritus of past financing
practices which are now coming to light or have taken a turn for the worst - an
ex post framework - and policies that seek to create the conditions that would
avoid another similar crisis - an ex ante perspective. The second is a
distinction in legal and policy reactions between structural approaches - such
as changing the regulatory environment for mortgage markets and attending to
the substantive terms of consumer protection - and procedural reforms that
See Walsh, supra note 21, at 162.
226 Those who criticize the National Mortgage Settlement for being too heavy-handed
have argued that it merely sought to exploit the robosigning controversy - and related
controversies over servicing practices - and amounts to "additional economic 'stimulus' to
housing without going to Congress," and, indeed, a threat to the rule of law. See David
Skeel, Mortgage Settlement or Mortgage Shakedown?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 2012, at Al9.
This critique suggests a view of the political economy of mortgage regulation that is, to say
the least, curious, given the history of multiple bailouts of the finance industry in the crisis
and the lack of any significant structural borrower-side reform to date.
227 For a review of current developments at the federal level, see Block-Lieb & Janger,
supra note 23, at 683. For an overview of state-level attempts to facilitate modifications
prior to foreclosure, see Walsh, supra note 21, at 139. See generally Kathleen C. Engle,
Symposium - States in the Vanguard: ProtectingConsumers During the FinancialCrisis Foreword,44 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1, 1 (2011).
225
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focus on the technical aspects of the ways in which housing is financed and
collateral realized. This classification creates a basic grid of ex ante/ex post
and substantive/procedural variations.
Some responses to the crisis implicate multiple parts of this taxonomy, but
the formalist turn falls into one particular quadrant: it is an ex post reaction that
focuses squarely on the procedural aspects of mortgage distress. A number of
states have similarly tried to recalibrate their foreclosure processes, moving the
dial toward greater or lesser procedural protection for distressed home
borrowers. Some states have placed more extensive litigation requirements on
foreclosing parties, 228 some have required more transparency and information
from lender-side actors, 229 and others have simply instituted changes speeding
up the process of foreclosure. 230 These reforms are all variations of post hoc,
procedural approaches that, at best, tangentially address the causes of the
housing crisis's lingering legacy. 2 3 1
The New York court rule that requires certification for foreclosure, see supra
note
122, is one example. California, to cite another example, recently enacted two measures that
are designed to reform the foreclosure process. Acts of July 11, 2012, chs. 86 & 87, 2012
Cal. Legis. Serv. 2300, 2318 (West) (codified as amended at CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 2920.52924.20 (West Supp. 2013)); see also Justin T. Hilley, Homeowner Bill of Rights Signed
Into Law, HOUSINGWIRE (July, 11 2012, 1:52 PM), http://www.housingwire.com/news/home
owner-bill-rights-signed-law. The first measure bars "dual-tracking" or pursuing
foreclosures while lenders are considering loss-mitigation efforts such as loan
modifications, §§ 2923.6, 2924.11, while the companion measure, like the National
Mortgage Settlement and other regulatory efforts, mandates a single point of contact for
borrowers to address loan-related concerns, § 2923.7. The latter measure also creates
statutory damages of up to $50,000 for fraudulently signing foreclosure documents without
verification of accuracy. See §§ 2924.12(b), 2924.17, 2924.19(b).
229 This is primarily seen in servicing reforms that attempt
to forestall foreclosure by
requiring, for example, servicers to provide new disclosures, respond in a timely manner to
complaints, and promptly provide payoff information. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 1418, 1463, 1464, 124 Stat. 1376,
2153-54, 2182-85 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1638a, 1639f, 1639g and 12 U.S.C. §
2605 (Supp. V 2011)).
230 Florida, for example, has experimented with a foreclosure
"rocket docket." Tami
Luhby, Florida Pulls Plug on Rocket-Docket ForeclosureCourts, CNN MONEY (May 25,
2011, 1:31 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/05/24/news/economy/florida-foreclosure/inde
x.htm.
231In terms of on-the-ground consequences of the foreclosure crisis in particular
communities, there are a number of place-based interventions being tested to respond to the
myriad of interrelated problems posed by mortgage defaults and delinquencies. These
include neighborhood-level stabilization efforts, such as: the rounds of federal
Neighborhood Stabilization Programs; blight-prevention and remediation initiatives by local
communities, non-profits, and even lenders; and a variety of tools to clear the backlog of
real estate owned property, both of the FHA and of the banks. See Robin S. Golden,
Building Policy Through CollaborativeDeliberation: A Reflection on Using Lessons from
Practiceto Inform Responses to the Mortgage ForeclosureCrisis, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
228
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There are some promising reforms, however, that have attempted to address
the aftermath in more substantive and structural terms, even if fundamental
232
changes such as reform to bankruptcy have not gained traction. Mandatory
mediation requirements, which are becoming increasingly common, present an
alternative avenue for addressing mortgage distress that is intended to allow
borrowers to negotiate loan modifications and other substantive changes to the
terms of their mortgages. 233 Moreover, efforts by regulators to mandate loss
mitigation that takes into account individual borrower circumstances similarly
2 34
resonate with the equitable origins of consumer protection in mortgage law.
In terms of restructuring regulation for future mortgages, the historical
balance between individual substantive fairness and procedural regularity
733, 740 (2011). To return to the grid, these are all in some ways examples of substantive
efforts to respond, post hoc, to the crisis.
232 One example of a creative reform effort that is situated in the post hoc substantive
arena is a proposal for municipalities to use their power of eminent domain to modify
underwater mortgages, using that traditional power to overcome the collective action
problems that have impeded even economically rational mortgage modifications that
continue to hinder housing recovery. See Joe Nocera, Housing's Last Chance?, N.Y. TIMES,
Jul. 9, 2012, at A21 ("We're four years into a housing crisis. Nothing has yet worked to
stem the terrible tide of foreclosures. It's time to give eminent domain a try."); Robert C.
Hockett, It Takes a Village: Municipal Condemnation Proceedings and Public/Private
Partnershipsfor Mortgage Loan Modification, Value Preservation,and Economic Recovery
29 (Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-12, 2012), available at
29
http://ssrn.com/abstract-20380 . Under the proposal, local governments would "take"
selected mortgages, paying just compensation to the affected lien holder, and then work
with borrowers to structure repayments discounted to the level at which the borrower would
be able to obtain new financing in the current market. Hockett, supra, at 30-31. Bond
investors have raised concerns about whether this will deter lending, raise interest rates, and
leave some borrowers out of relief. See Jacob Gaffney, Investors Warn Eminent Domain
Spells Imminent Disaster,HousINGWIRE (July 24, 2012, 10:07 AM), http://www.housingwir
The proposal,
e.com/rewired/investors-warn-eminent-domain-spells-imminent-disaster.
above, this
outlined
matrix
the
of
terms
the
in
concerns;
these
mitigate
however, may
proposal seeks to solve the legacy problem posed by the housing bubble and does so in a
way that responds to the substantive, particularized circumstances of individual borrowers.
233 This category includes newly enacted mandatory mediation efforts. See CONN. GEN.
STAT., § 49-3 In (2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5062D (2012); Saving D.C. Homes from
Foreclosure Enhanced Emergency Amendment Act of 2012, 59 D.C. Reg. 7380 (June 22,
2012) (amending D.C. CODE §§ 42-815.01 to 42-815.03). These mediation programs are
available in over twenty states and are helping families modify their loans and remain in
their homes. Leah Schnurr, Struggling U.S. Homeowners Avert Foreclosure via Mediation,
REUTERS (July 5, 2012, 12:59 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/05/usa-housing
-mediation-idUSL2E8I3F3020120705.
234 See, e.g., Act of Mar. 31, 2011, No. 885, § 3, 2011-3 Ark. Adv. Legis. Serv. 984, 987
(LexisNexis) (codified as amended at ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-50-104 (2012)); Act of May 10,
2011, Pub. L. No. 170-2011, 2011 Ind. Acts 1891; Act of Aug. 3, 2012, ch. 194, 2012 Mass.
Legis. Serv. 705 (West); Act of Apr. 13, 2011, ch. 58, 2011 Wash. Sess. Laws 580 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of WASH. REV. CODE chs. 61.24 & 82.45).
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suggests that it would behoove regulators to move beyond the informational
and procedural structures that have been at the core of regimes such as TILA
and RESPA. 235 Where it has become clear that market failures are not likely to
be solved by informational strategies, more substantive regulatory approaches
are necessary. 236 In sum, the legacy of the substantive focus of equity for
borrowers and the irony of lender antiformalism, if nothing else, is a reminder
of how important it is to continue to press for reform for borrowers caught up
in the aftermath.
C.

Coda: The Crystal This Time?
This discussion circles back to the question raised at the outset: what does
the formal turn suggest about larger theoretical concerns in the development of
mortgage law, and of property law more generally? The perennial cycle that
Carol Rose described, with hard-edged, law-oriented, relatively clear rules
competing with more open-ended, equitable approaches in an ongoing
dialectic, 237 has a higher-order parallel in terms of theoretical conceptions of
property and the methodology implicit in those approaches. Indeed, the divide
between contemporary formalism and pluralism in property theory has taken
on new prominence, and the post-crisis jurisprudence offers a chance to
evaluate this divide in a moment of rapid change.
On one side of this debate, conceptualists see property (descriptively and
normatively) as having a foundational core of bright-line rules, whether
because of information-cost advantages, the centrality of moral certainty, or
other reasons. 238 Henry Smith, for example, sees property in modular terms,
built around an essentially Blackstonian understanding of property. 239 This
conception places heavy emphasis on exclusion or exclusive use in the
definition of property rights, and the rigid borders that come with those rights.
Conceptualists in this mold are not the formalists of old, but, as a
methodological matter, tend to see property in relatively static, essentialist
terms that map on to the formalist side of the rules/standard debate. 240
See supra text accompanying notes 144-48.
As noted, Dodd-Frank's potential for structural regulation of the
terms of origination
is a promising example of this. See supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
237 See Rose, supra note 29,
at 583-85.
238 See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky,
Reconfiguring Property in Three
Dimensions, 75 U. CI. L. REv. 1015, 1015-17 (2008) (arguing for a "Blackstonian edifice"
consisting of absolute dominion, sole ownership, and broad subject matter). Likewise, neoLockean property theory can, at times, carry some reflections of conceptualism in its
natural-rights orientation. See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Jefferson Meets Coase: Land-Use Torts,
Law and Economics, and Natural PropertyRights, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1379, 1401
(2010).
239 See Smith, supra note 27, at
1694.
240 The right to exclude, for example, goes
to the definition of property and not to the
procedures through which property rights are protected. That said, there seems to be a
235
236
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On the other side, pluralists in property theory counter with conceptions
that, from a methodological perspective, privilege context and the contingent
nature of property rights. 241 Thus, Joseph Singer has recently argued,
convincingly, that there has been a sustained and broad-based shift across a
number of domains of property law toward reasonableness standards in the
second half of the twentieth century.242 Tracing the evolution of doctrine in
areas such as the right to exclude, immunity from loss, the freedom to use
property, and the power to transfer, Singer discerns developments that, in the
process of modernizing archaic areas of doctrine, shifted from rule-based
approaches to standards that elevate the traditional role of equity in
243
highlighting contextual, ethically sensitive decisionmaking in property.
Rose's observation about the cycle she identifies being generally
recurrent 244 - as opposed to linear long-term trends - provides an inroad into
this methodological debate. The rise in the kind of formalism evident in the
aftermath of the housing crisis might thus seem at first blush to confirm some
of the premises of conceptualism, particularly the value of clear notice and the
importance of holding those with property interests to the strict terms of their
interests, although Rose's view suggests that concerns about brittleness in the
foreclosure system may eventually cycle back toward equity.
Approaching new formalism on a deeper level, however, reveals the tension
between its emergence and the absolutism that characterizes conceptualism.
The shifts in the jurisprudence that have surfaced in the past five years, and
which represent a relatively swift reaction to the felt necessity of the crisis,
suggest a more contingent, and flexible, foundation for property.
Conceptualists in property theory may focus on the endurance and stability of
distinctive confluence in the literature between substantive conceptions of the absolute
nature of property and respect for procedural regularity in the adjudication of disputes over
those strict rights. Cf, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of
Property,48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1849, 1854-55, 1857 (2007).
241 Pluralists tend to be more agnostic about what is core and what is periphery within
property law as a whole and within the particular contexts in which property law plays out the kind of configuration of entitlements and obligations that Hanoch Dagan has called
property "institutions." HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 4 (2011). A
pluralist perspective on the new formalism would emphasize the inevitably contingent
resolution of the set of conflicting values - certainty and flexibility, the benefit of the
bargain and distributive justice, among others - at play in this set of legal developments.
242 Singer, supra note 28, at 3.
243 Id. at 20-49. Surveying doctrines as diverse as trespass and public accommodations,
equitable division of property upon divorce, the caselaw on liability for flooding, landlordtenant law, and the estates system, among others, Singer argues that the rise of
reasonableness tests serve broad-based systemic interests in property, including setting
minimum standards and more explicitly resolving conflicting values such as autonomy. Id.
at 49-63. Many of these areas represent overlapping private law concerns at the intersection
of property and contract, such as landlord-tenant law. Cf supra note 123.
244See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
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absolute dominion in its various forms, but in practice, the system of property
can adapt rapidly to changing circumstances, even if the remedial modalities
have given primacy to determinacy in the current crisis. 2 45 Thus, one final
irony that the new formalism underscores is that because the emerging
response has been so contextual - driven by individual advocacy choices and
the courts' dialectical responses to those choices - it actually supports the
assumptions underlying pluralism much more comfortably than the timeless
essentialism on which formalism has traditionally depended.
CONCLUSION

The mortgage system is both a microcosm of the larger financial markets in
which it now operates and a repository of a long accretion of common law,
equitable, and legislative structures for balancing the interests of borrowers and
lenders. When the housing crisis emerged, it brought into stark relief a
disjunction between traditional norms of the individual mortgage transaction
and a secondary market that thrived on informality. As this conflict has been
litigated, courts have been increasingly receptive to holding lending-side
interests to the strict letter of the law.
The housing crisis will continue to shape property law for years, but in the
immediate aftermath, the phenomenon of borrowers invoking the strictures of
formalism and lenders seeking the mercies of vague compliance portends a
period of heightened formalism. In an era in which there has been relatively
little fundamental policy response for distressed borrowers, it is understandable
that advocates would reach for any available tool to defend distressed
borrowers, and perhaps equally understandable that courts would respond to
this advocacy. Moreover, in the absence of significant momentum for
structural reform, the leverage this provides might be the best that borrowers
can do. If nothing else, the emerging caselaw has exposed serious technical
flaws in the mortgage securitization system.
This Article, however, has attempted to situate this emergent shift in both a
historical light and also in the theoretical context of mortgage law as a realm of
property that brings into particularly sharp focus the tension between
formalism and flexibility. For those concerned about the long-term structural
balance between procedural regularity and substantive fairness embodied in the
traditional realms of law and equity, the brittleness that the new formalism may
be ushering in is worth considering and, perhaps, cause for redoubling efforts
to find structural solutions to a crisis that even now continues.

245 Moreover,

the association between the certainty and clarity that attend formalism and

general expectations supposedly at the heart of property law - one of the classic arguments
for valorizing formalism - ignores the expectations of many people who approach property
with instincts that comport more with equity's concern for contextual fairness. See Nestor
M. Davidson, Property'sMorale, 110 MICH. L. REv. 437, 466 (2011).

